I'm in the middle of "Confessions of an Economic Hit Men," and though having only read the first 80 pages or so of it, it is quite amazing to realize just how dirty the international system is. Economic hit men are a special breed, a tiny gear in a system bent on subjugating the Third World without firing a single bullet. Economic hit men serve the interests of the larger empire without receiving a single dime from them. They are contracted by private firms which function as the backbone of the system. To summarize the central points of the book, economic hit men are those especially trained to do the following (1) convince the public and other countries that billions of dollars of foreign investments are justified by (fake) future economic growth in order to (2) funnel the money back into American private companies by requiring that the receivers of aid contract only American firms en-route to (3) bankrupt these countries, forcing them to heavily rely on the debtor, in this case, the American government.
The plan goes roughly as followed. The U.S. government would signal the willingness to aid Third World countries. The hit men, or the (sham) economists as they would be called, would be hired to "impartially" analyze the economic potential of the host countries and to convince them that the only way to achieve such growth is through borrowing foreign money. As soon as these countries go heads over heels to line up for aid, the U.S. would stipulate that they must contract American firms to do the construction. Most of the times, it doesn't even have to do that, for very few non-American or non-Western firms possess the capacity. Money then would be funneled right back into American hands while the host countries, indebted to the U.S., would be forced to accept American demands.
This theory is disputed, but the idea is certainly not new. It's just a dirtier version of the American Liberal World Order. In the modern international system, wars are the marks of diplomatic failure. To subjugate other countries through a blend of incentives and coercion is the hallmark of excellence. Look at the most recent wars conducted by the U.S., and it comes as no surprise that the majority of them (Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq) lie in the Middle East. The region is rich in oil but it is also rich in culture. The Middle East poses the toughest challenge to the spreading of the American hegemonic order. Unlike Ecuador, which "blossomed" thanks to the U.S.' "aid" in building up its oil infrastructure, the Middle Eastern countries hold a monopoly of oil on their own. They are not at the mercy of American aid, nor are they willing to compromise their cultural values in exchange for material benefits.
The World Bank is no saint; it's a Western creation and will forever remain one. With economic liberalization spreading to remote parts of the world, Western international institutions are cornering the market. There's no such thing as aid without precondition. There's such thing, however, as getting bankrupt and being forced to give up land for American bases or conform to American intentions in the UN. So what does this have to do with Vietnam? Well, the next time the World Bank forecasts a 7% growth over the next 10 years, someone should question that statistics.
Tuesday, May 25, 2010
Thursday, April 15, 2010
On Periclean Grand Strategy
This obviously does not have anything to do with East Asia, but ancient Greece will perpetually inform how a dominant power responds to a rising one *hint *hint
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The thirty-year long Peloponnesian War resulted in a crushing defeat of the Athenian Empire at the hands of Sparta and the dissolution of Athens’ power in the Greek international system. At the heart of the debate of why Athens lost the war was whether Pericles’ grand strategy was an effective and accurate one. Many scholars, such as Donald Kagan, have criticized Pericles for his exclusively defensive position and inaccurate judgment of the conflict. Others disagree, arguing that after the death of Pericles, it was precisely the reversal of his strategy and the lack of an unquestionable leader that led to Athenian demise. This paper seeks to determine whether Pericles’ grand strategy was a valid one. The analysis is based on three factors: accuracy of initial assessment, validity of strategic goals pursuant to the initial assessment that was made, and correctness of strategy pursuant to strategic goals and initial assessment that were made.
Initial assessment
As Sun Tzu taught, wars occur well before either side has fired a shot. Initial assumptions of the balance of power play a critical role in whether states enter war and how they proceed. Dominic Johnson points out that there are cognitive and biological biases that lead humans to unintentionally exaggerate their prospects in any endeavor. Was Pericles overly optimistic in his assessment of how the war would proceed?
- Offense: Athens’ primary military advantage lied in the magnificent fleet that had outmaneuvered a much larger and well-equipped Persian fleet at the battle of Salamis. While Athens’ naval power was superior to that of Sparta, its land forces were inferior.
- Defense: Athens was protected by two walls with a periphery largely used for agrarian purpose. The back of the city was connected to the port city of Piraeus, allowing for supply in the event of a siege. Defeating the city defense was therefore an extremely difficult task. The biggest threat to Sparta’s defense was internal. With an elite warrior class ruling over slaves (helots), there was a constant fear of a rebellion. Thus Sparta’s defense, and offense for that matter, was only as strong as their hold on domestic security.
- Finance: Athens enjoyed steady income from extracting tributes from its allies in the Delian League. In peacetime, Athenian citizens produced their own food and Athens was generally self-sufficient. Sparta, on the other hand, had no public fund and was not as rich. Their main source of emergency funds was the gold statues at Olympia and Delphi.
- Alliance: Athens’ main alliance system was the Delian League, which had formed in response to the invasion of Persia but continued to exist after its victory. By the time of the Peloponnesian War, the League had largely deteriorated into part of the Athenian Empire. The most prominent evidence of this was the relocation of the public fund from Delos to Athens, from which the Parthenon was financed. Sparta’s main alliance system was the Peloponnesian League, which operated largely on an equal basis. Sparta differed from Athens in that it did not extract tributes from its allies but it was equally susceptible to betrayal because these allies could be bought off with promises of democratic rule.
It appears that Pericles’ assessments laid out in his speech (Book 1 Line 150) match up well with reality. He correctly analyzed the military strengths and weaknesses of each side, as well as Athens’ superior financial position. One crucial aspect he might have missed was the changing nature of Athenian alliance. There was a gradually growing resentment of Athens from her allies in the Delian League due to her growing tyranny in the international system.
Strategic Goals
With Athens enjoying significant strategic advantage, why did Pericles prefer survival to an offensive victory? It is easy to say in hindsight that Athens should have adopted a different strategy, but given the situation, available resources and goals, the key question is whether a full out war would have benefited Athens more than a defensive war, irrespective of execution. The answer is an overwhelming “yes.”
To prove this, it is important to identify the goal of Pericles. First, the present situation favored Athens and Pericles was perfectly content with maintaining the status quo. Athens was on the rise and its influence was being felt throughout the Greek World. Preservation of the status quo would allow Athens to continue projecting its wealth and power and eventually overtake Sparta as the leader of the Greek world. Second, complete victory over Sparta would have been ideal but at what cost? Even if Athens wanted to go on the offensive, it could not afford to do so without committing major material and human resources. Any outright war would have to be fought on land eventually, and Athenian land forces were in no position to fight their elite Spartan counterparts. Pericles had two options (1) fight a defensive war to frustrate Sparta and convince her of the infeasibility of defeating Athens or (2) mobilize for a protracted war and buy time to train an elite land force. The latter was not ideal because of the potentially high cost of human lives and material resources. The former was a better choice, especially considering the strong possibility that Athens could win defensively because it was difficult for Sparta to conduct a protracted siege and to build and finance a fleet capable of blockading Athens.
Rather than engaging in a war of certain losses yet uncertain victory, Pericles made the right decision in choosing what appeared to be surefire survival at a low cost over than risky protracted war at an extremely high cost. Even though the ultimate goal was the defeat of Sparta, Athens was not in a position to do so just yet. Protecting the empire is crucial to defending the mechanism that has and would continue to allow Athens to build up comprehensive power to the point where it can wage wars with a much higher chance of victory.
Periclean Grand Strategy – The Strategic Aspect
It is established that winning a cheap defensive war is much more beneficial than winning an expensive protracted war. How to achieve that goal is an entirely different matter altogether. When analyzing a strategy, it is important to differentiate between design flaws and mechanical errors, between bad plans and bad executions.
Pericles’ specific strategy consisted of three main components:
(1) To withdraw all citizens into the city and allow Sparta control over the periphery
(2) To raid Sparta’ coastal allies to keep Sparta at bay
(3) To refrain from engaging in pitched battles or going on the offensive
Fighting a successful defensive war requires two key elements (1) the ability to financially and physically withstand attacks and (2) the ability to force the enemy to occasionally, if not permanently, break off attacks. Athens possessed both of these elements. With an almost impregnable Long Wall and ample (and renewable) financial resources, Athens was a nightmare for attackers. In fact, even at the end of the Peloponnesian War when defeat was certain, Athens was able to hold out for eight months. Nevertheless, none of this would matter if Sparta could lay siege continuously until Athenians starve to death. Athens’ possession of an elite fleet that can raid Sparta’s allies allowed it to plunder resources and forced Sparta to divide its effort between laying siege and defending the homeland. Furthermore, the nature of Sparta’s society, which depended on the helot majority remaining under control, meant that even without the nuisance that was Athenian raids, Sparta could not have maintained a consistent siege on Athens.
Periclean Grand Strategy – Execution and Human Responses
As prescient as Pericles was out of the strategic aspect of the war, he unfortunately did not take into consideration and could not control the human aspects of it, specifically the response of his own people, his allies, and his enemy. The failure of his strategy lay in operational errors.
With regards to Sparta, Pericles said in his speech, “The slowness with which it[money] comes in will cause delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man.” And yet by not checking Sparta’s ability to build a fleet, Pericles was giving his enemy precisely the kind of time-buying opportunity that it needed. While it is debatable whether Pericles misjudged how easy or difficult it was for Sparta to build a fleet, he certainly misjudged the changing balance of power. With Sparta acting as if it were the rising power and moving to address the vital weakness that is naval power, Athens, by not concentrating equally hard on improving its land forces, was allowing Sparta to eventually catch up no matter how slow. Even by the time Athens abruptly reversed Pericles’ strategy after his death, it was clear that Sparta had already managed to build a fleet capable of challenging that of Athens.
While Pericles was correct in predicting that Sparta could not conduct a protracted siege because men were expected to be at home for the harvests (in fact, the longest Spartan invasion lasted just forty days), he did not or could not have anticipated the effect that even these short attacks could have on the morale of Athens and her allies. Athenians, once proud of their ability to go anywhere and overpower anyone, are now voluntarily trapped in the city and forced to watch the Spartans pillage their land. While the physical and material damages were much lower than what Athens could absorb, the psychological damage was far beyond that was acceptable to Athenians. Furthermore, cramped and crowded living conditions were probably one of the chief causes of the infamous plague that depleted Athens’ human resources for war.
Sparta’s attacks also served to further deteriorate relations between her and her allies, some of whom had already shown signs of discontent well before the war. The reliance of Athens on her allies for funding during the siege was heavily dependent on the ability of Athens’ preponderance of power. Her prestige took a hard hit with each successive Sparta attack that was not responded in kind.
A competent land force, not even an elite one on the level of Sparta, would have been massively useful for Athens. A defensive war entails suffering acceptable costs to create unacceptable costs for the other side. An Athenian land army would not have needed to win an outright battle to defeat Sparta. It just needed to, in the words of Clausewitz, “nibble at the shells.” Quick hit-and-runs could have been effective at chipping off inflexible and slow phalanxes. Athenians lives would have been lost, but this would have both given the appearance of resistance that would have boosted the morale of Athenians and ensured that the Spartan army returned home each time weaker than when they had left. Otherwise there would be no motivation for Sparta to stop their attacks. Whether the ability to wage guerilla warfare should be expected of a general living in the 4th century BC is debatable, but the belief that Sparta would give up on its own accord without any real military losses was a key operational mistake.
Final Words
Very rarely do grand strategies work like they are intended to and fail in the very end. More often, grand strategies are plagued by operational errors, unpredicted external circumstances, all of which was collectively termed “friction” by von Clausewitz. Grand strategies are designed to respond to a fixed threat based on fixed initial assessments of situation, both of which were liable to change. The inflexibility that inherently accompanies any grand strategy made it difficult to respond to these changes. Given his goals and the resources at his disposal, Pericles’ initial grand strategy was accurate. Taken into consideration execution, human responses and changing external circumstances, however, a reversal of his strategy was also accurate. It was military radicalization, the precise folly that Pericles warned against, that spelled the demise of the great Athenian empire.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The thirty-year long Peloponnesian War resulted in a crushing defeat of the Athenian Empire at the hands of Sparta and the dissolution of Athens’ power in the Greek international system. At the heart of the debate of why Athens lost the war was whether Pericles’ grand strategy was an effective and accurate one. Many scholars, such as Donald Kagan, have criticized Pericles for his exclusively defensive position and inaccurate judgment of the conflict. Others disagree, arguing that after the death of Pericles, it was precisely the reversal of his strategy and the lack of an unquestionable leader that led to Athenian demise. This paper seeks to determine whether Pericles’ grand strategy was a valid one. The analysis is based on three factors: accuracy of initial assessment, validity of strategic goals pursuant to the initial assessment that was made, and correctness of strategy pursuant to strategic goals and initial assessment that were made.
Initial assessment
As Sun Tzu taught, wars occur well before either side has fired a shot. Initial assumptions of the balance of power play a critical role in whether states enter war and how they proceed. Dominic Johnson points out that there are cognitive and biological biases that lead humans to unintentionally exaggerate their prospects in any endeavor. Was Pericles overly optimistic in his assessment of how the war would proceed?
- Offense: Athens’ primary military advantage lied in the magnificent fleet that had outmaneuvered a much larger and well-equipped Persian fleet at the battle of Salamis. While Athens’ naval power was superior to that of Sparta, its land forces were inferior.
- Defense: Athens was protected by two walls with a periphery largely used for agrarian purpose. The back of the city was connected to the port city of Piraeus, allowing for supply in the event of a siege. Defeating the city defense was therefore an extremely difficult task. The biggest threat to Sparta’s defense was internal. With an elite warrior class ruling over slaves (helots), there was a constant fear of a rebellion. Thus Sparta’s defense, and offense for that matter, was only as strong as their hold on domestic security.
- Finance: Athens enjoyed steady income from extracting tributes from its allies in the Delian League. In peacetime, Athenian citizens produced their own food and Athens was generally self-sufficient. Sparta, on the other hand, had no public fund and was not as rich. Their main source of emergency funds was the gold statues at Olympia and Delphi.
- Alliance: Athens’ main alliance system was the Delian League, which had formed in response to the invasion of Persia but continued to exist after its victory. By the time of the Peloponnesian War, the League had largely deteriorated into part of the Athenian Empire. The most prominent evidence of this was the relocation of the public fund from Delos to Athens, from which the Parthenon was financed. Sparta’s main alliance system was the Peloponnesian League, which operated largely on an equal basis. Sparta differed from Athens in that it did not extract tributes from its allies but it was equally susceptible to betrayal because these allies could be bought off with promises of democratic rule.
It appears that Pericles’ assessments laid out in his speech (Book 1 Line 150) match up well with reality. He correctly analyzed the military strengths and weaknesses of each side, as well as Athens’ superior financial position. One crucial aspect he might have missed was the changing nature of Athenian alliance. There was a gradually growing resentment of Athens from her allies in the Delian League due to her growing tyranny in the international system.
Strategic Goals
With Athens enjoying significant strategic advantage, why did Pericles prefer survival to an offensive victory? It is easy to say in hindsight that Athens should have adopted a different strategy, but given the situation, available resources and goals, the key question is whether a full out war would have benefited Athens more than a defensive war, irrespective of execution. The answer is an overwhelming “yes.”
To prove this, it is important to identify the goal of Pericles. First, the present situation favored Athens and Pericles was perfectly content with maintaining the status quo. Athens was on the rise and its influence was being felt throughout the Greek World. Preservation of the status quo would allow Athens to continue projecting its wealth and power and eventually overtake Sparta as the leader of the Greek world. Second, complete victory over Sparta would have been ideal but at what cost? Even if Athens wanted to go on the offensive, it could not afford to do so without committing major material and human resources. Any outright war would have to be fought on land eventually, and Athenian land forces were in no position to fight their elite Spartan counterparts. Pericles had two options (1) fight a defensive war to frustrate Sparta and convince her of the infeasibility of defeating Athens or (2) mobilize for a protracted war and buy time to train an elite land force. The latter was not ideal because of the potentially high cost of human lives and material resources. The former was a better choice, especially considering the strong possibility that Athens could win defensively because it was difficult for Sparta to conduct a protracted siege and to build and finance a fleet capable of blockading Athens.
Rather than engaging in a war of certain losses yet uncertain victory, Pericles made the right decision in choosing what appeared to be surefire survival at a low cost over than risky protracted war at an extremely high cost. Even though the ultimate goal was the defeat of Sparta, Athens was not in a position to do so just yet. Protecting the empire is crucial to defending the mechanism that has and would continue to allow Athens to build up comprehensive power to the point where it can wage wars with a much higher chance of victory.
Periclean Grand Strategy – The Strategic Aspect
It is established that winning a cheap defensive war is much more beneficial than winning an expensive protracted war. How to achieve that goal is an entirely different matter altogether. When analyzing a strategy, it is important to differentiate between design flaws and mechanical errors, between bad plans and bad executions.
Pericles’ specific strategy consisted of three main components:
(1) To withdraw all citizens into the city and allow Sparta control over the periphery
(2) To raid Sparta’ coastal allies to keep Sparta at bay
(3) To refrain from engaging in pitched battles or going on the offensive
Fighting a successful defensive war requires two key elements (1) the ability to financially and physically withstand attacks and (2) the ability to force the enemy to occasionally, if not permanently, break off attacks. Athens possessed both of these elements. With an almost impregnable Long Wall and ample (and renewable) financial resources, Athens was a nightmare for attackers. In fact, even at the end of the Peloponnesian War when defeat was certain, Athens was able to hold out for eight months. Nevertheless, none of this would matter if Sparta could lay siege continuously until Athenians starve to death. Athens’ possession of an elite fleet that can raid Sparta’s allies allowed it to plunder resources and forced Sparta to divide its effort between laying siege and defending the homeland. Furthermore, the nature of Sparta’s society, which depended on the helot majority remaining under control, meant that even without the nuisance that was Athenian raids, Sparta could not have maintained a consistent siege on Athens.
Periclean Grand Strategy – Execution and Human Responses
As prescient as Pericles was out of the strategic aspect of the war, he unfortunately did not take into consideration and could not control the human aspects of it, specifically the response of his own people, his allies, and his enemy. The failure of his strategy lay in operational errors.
With regards to Sparta, Pericles said in his speech, “The slowness with which it[money] comes in will cause delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man.” And yet by not checking Sparta’s ability to build a fleet, Pericles was giving his enemy precisely the kind of time-buying opportunity that it needed. While it is debatable whether Pericles misjudged how easy or difficult it was for Sparta to build a fleet, he certainly misjudged the changing balance of power. With Sparta acting as if it were the rising power and moving to address the vital weakness that is naval power, Athens, by not concentrating equally hard on improving its land forces, was allowing Sparta to eventually catch up no matter how slow. Even by the time Athens abruptly reversed Pericles’ strategy after his death, it was clear that Sparta had already managed to build a fleet capable of challenging that of Athens.
While Pericles was correct in predicting that Sparta could not conduct a protracted siege because men were expected to be at home for the harvests (in fact, the longest Spartan invasion lasted just forty days), he did not or could not have anticipated the effect that even these short attacks could have on the morale of Athens and her allies. Athenians, once proud of their ability to go anywhere and overpower anyone, are now voluntarily trapped in the city and forced to watch the Spartans pillage their land. While the physical and material damages were much lower than what Athens could absorb, the psychological damage was far beyond that was acceptable to Athenians. Furthermore, cramped and crowded living conditions were probably one of the chief causes of the infamous plague that depleted Athens’ human resources for war.
Sparta’s attacks also served to further deteriorate relations between her and her allies, some of whom had already shown signs of discontent well before the war. The reliance of Athens on her allies for funding during the siege was heavily dependent on the ability of Athens’ preponderance of power. Her prestige took a hard hit with each successive Sparta attack that was not responded in kind.
A competent land force, not even an elite one on the level of Sparta, would have been massively useful for Athens. A defensive war entails suffering acceptable costs to create unacceptable costs for the other side. An Athenian land army would not have needed to win an outright battle to defeat Sparta. It just needed to, in the words of Clausewitz, “nibble at the shells.” Quick hit-and-runs could have been effective at chipping off inflexible and slow phalanxes. Athenians lives would have been lost, but this would have both given the appearance of resistance that would have boosted the morale of Athenians and ensured that the Spartan army returned home each time weaker than when they had left. Otherwise there would be no motivation for Sparta to stop their attacks. Whether the ability to wage guerilla warfare should be expected of a general living in the 4th century BC is debatable, but the belief that Sparta would give up on its own accord without any real military losses was a key operational mistake.
Final Words
Very rarely do grand strategies work like they are intended to and fail in the very end. More often, grand strategies are plagued by operational errors, unpredicted external circumstances, all of which was collectively termed “friction” by von Clausewitz. Grand strategies are designed to respond to a fixed threat based on fixed initial assessments of situation, both of which were liable to change. The inflexibility that inherently accompanies any grand strategy made it difficult to respond to these changes. Given his goals and the resources at his disposal, Pericles’ initial grand strategy was accurate. Taken into consideration execution, human responses and changing external circumstances, however, a reversal of his strategy was also accurate. It was military radicalization, the precise folly that Pericles warned against, that spelled the demise of the great Athenian empire.
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
On the South Korean Model for Internet Development
During break in one of my classes last week, Professor Felten mentioned an interesting story about a Korean graduate student who was shell-shocked upon learning just how low the rate of broadband internet penetration in the US is. His reaction is certainly excusable if you consider the fact that Korea ranks first in that category at 2.466 per 10 people, almost doubling that of the U.S. at 1.382, which places it at #16 overall (see top 31 here). The reason as to why this happens to be the case, however, is not so clear-cut. In 1995, Korea had less than one Internet user per 100 inhabitants. That rate is now 55 per 100. What explains this miraculous development in South Korea?
When analyzing the rate of broadband penetration, several factors need to be taken into account (in no particular order):
1) Population density
2) Average income
3) Level of education
4) Economic orientation
5) Governmental policy
I took some time to compile this chart that focuses on a few select countries in the top 20 in terms of broadband penetration, with a special focus on Asian countries. High literacy rate and high income seem to be the pre-requisite for high broadband penetration but correlation does not necessarily imply direct causation. It is likely that high literacy rate and high income lead to a wide variety of positive social developments which enable high internet usage. The list shows that each of the other independent variables separately can account for why some countries rank higher than others but together they do need produce a consistent reason for my the ranking is the way it is. What this chart basically shows is that while each of the indicators above is a necessary condition for high broadband penetration, each cannot fully explain why South Korea ranks first despite not having the best scores in any of the indicators (in fact, SK trails the leaders by substantial amounts in each one).
I believe that the factors that separates South Korea from some of the other developed states are economic orientation and government policy. South Korean economy stands out from the rest in that there is an extreme focus on developing the Information and Communication Technology industry whereas the other economies are diversified. We don’t think of ICT products as the bread and butter of these countries’ economies. South Korea’s economic miracle shows a shift from primitive industries like textiles and chemicals to heavy industries and ICT products. The ICT industry accounts for half of the consistent 8% GDP growth over four decades, 13% of the economy (data in 2000) and 1/3 of export. Economic development in turn boosts the demand for more hi-tech products and means of communications. While ICT certainly plays a much bigger role in SK than in other countries, it is hard-pressed to say that economic profit automatically trickles down to the general population. Demand can’t be met where there is no supply. In this aspect, SK differs remarkably from other developed nations in that the government takes a pro-active role in mandating constant improvements in ICT infrastructure. The government:
requires telecommunication operators to contribute to government programmes for industry development. Unlike other countries, this money is reinvested in the telecommunication sector instead of being transferred to other areas of the government.
New and better technologies sometimes fail not because they don’t work but because there are significant infrastructural and policy barriers. Adopting next-generation technologies is often a two-way street. First these technologies must be able to enjoy low barriers of entry to the market. Second, there must be ways to streamline the delivery of these hi-tech services to the general public at low cost. Third, there must be ways to respond to sudden rise in demand of these new hi-tech services. South Korea, with its emphasis on ICT development and recognition of importance of improved infrastructures for communications, seems to be doing precisely that. Don’t be surprised if rising Asian tigers like Vietnam, with breathtaking pace of Internet penetration resemblant of South Korea in its hay-day, will choose the South Korean models over other supposedly more advanced economies like the U.S.
Last summer I did market research on the Vietnamese ICT industry with a special focus on FPT and its economic model*. Vietnam, given its high density population, penchant for technologies as well as government's encouragement of the ICT sector, should experience a South Korea-like growth but it can continue to modify business laws that encourage small businesses. What SK had that Vietnam currently doesn't are the big corporations like Samsung, LG to which a large percentage of ICT products are fed (Note: this includes not only softwares but hardware as well). While it is not impossible, it is highly probable that these giants will emerge anytime soon Vietnam. As a result, one should bank on the ICT sector being dominated by software outsourcing in the year to come. The detailed report (the pdf version does not do it justice) can be found here (all rights reserved)
*A shameless pat on the back, I predicted FPT's floor value to hover around the VND86,668/share and voila, FPT's share has claimed gradually from below 70.000VND/share to what is now 86.500VND/share. It's time to sell.
Sunday, February 14, 2010
On the Nature of Security in Southeast Asia
An interesting bit I did for the first Junior Paper required at Princeton. The second will be posted soon, within a month or so.
Abstract:
When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967, few expected it to outlast its two short-lived predecessors, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo. Four decades later, a now thriving ASEAN has defied expectations and expanded to include all but one country in Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s survival and growth deserve special recognition; after all, Southeast Asia was one of the most unstable regions in the world during the Cold War. Whether ASEAN has been an effective security organization, however, is a more contentious debate. If one were to judge ASEAN on its ability to provide an informal medium for government elites to cooperate in security matters, then it would be fair to make such assertion. If one should, however, judge ASEAN on its ability to compel its members to respect the absolute interests of their citizens and the region as a whole, then ASEAN has been a failure. As Southeast Asia strives to achieve a common voice, ASEAN finds itself drifting precariously between these two ends of the spectrum. While ASEAN’s rhetoric has overwhelmingly suggested the imminent birth of a security community, its actions have been less consistent with that vision.
Scholars of International Relations (IR) have employed several theoretical frameworks to explain the nature of cooperation and competition among Southeast Asian nations. Neorealists claim that the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice is due to the selfish nature of member states. Constructivists disagree, arguing that norms and principles influence the way member states interact. Actions that might appear contradictory to rhetoric actually conform to ASEAN’s norms. This paper rejects the notion that strategic interests and norms are mutually exclusive and instead argue that they both play important roles in shaping the nature of ASEAN. ASEAN’s success depends on how well it frames controversial strategic interests in terms of over-arching ideological concepts that appeal to all member states. The ability to find an ideological consensus that transcends differences in interests has been a hallmark of ASEAN’s diplomatic culture.
The first section examines ASEAN within a security context and shows that ASEAN is indeed an implicit instrument of security. The second section analyzes the contending perspectives regarding the roles of strategic interests and norms. The next three sections examine the interplay of interests and norms in three significant historical events: the founding of ASEAN, the invasions of Cambodia and East Timor, and the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The last section evaluates the future prospect of ASEAN in light of the framework discussed in the paper.
Abstract:
When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967, few expected it to outlast its two short-lived predecessors, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo. Four decades later, a now thriving ASEAN has defied expectations and expanded to include all but one country in Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s survival and growth deserve special recognition; after all, Southeast Asia was one of the most unstable regions in the world during the Cold War. Whether ASEAN has been an effective security organization, however, is a more contentious debate. If one were to judge ASEAN on its ability to provide an informal medium for government elites to cooperate in security matters, then it would be fair to make such assertion. If one should, however, judge ASEAN on its ability to compel its members to respect the absolute interests of their citizens and the region as a whole, then ASEAN has been a failure. As Southeast Asia strives to achieve a common voice, ASEAN finds itself drifting precariously between these two ends of the spectrum. While ASEAN’s rhetoric has overwhelmingly suggested the imminent birth of a security community, its actions have been less consistent with that vision.
Scholars of International Relations (IR) have employed several theoretical frameworks to explain the nature of cooperation and competition among Southeast Asian nations. Neorealists claim that the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice is due to the selfish nature of member states. Constructivists disagree, arguing that norms and principles influence the way member states interact. Actions that might appear contradictory to rhetoric actually conform to ASEAN’s norms. This paper rejects the notion that strategic interests and norms are mutually exclusive and instead argue that they both play important roles in shaping the nature of ASEAN. ASEAN’s success depends on how well it frames controversial strategic interests in terms of over-arching ideological concepts that appeal to all member states. The ability to find an ideological consensus that transcends differences in interests has been a hallmark of ASEAN’s diplomatic culture.
The first section examines ASEAN within a security context and shows that ASEAN is indeed an implicit instrument of security. The second section analyzes the contending perspectives regarding the roles of strategic interests and norms. The next three sections examine the interplay of interests and norms in three significant historical events: the founding of ASEAN, the invasions of Cambodia and East Timor, and the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The last section evaluates the future prospect of ASEAN in light of the framework discussed in the paper.
Monday, January 25, 2010
On the Role of History in Modern East Asian Great Power Relations
After the USSR collapsed, many scholars predicted that East Asia would become “ripe for rivalry” because it has not exhibited the pattern of regionalism seen in Europe. By evaluating Asia’s future using Europe’s benchmark, Aaron Friedberg’s argument typifies the tendency of Western scholars to hold up a mirror of Europe to see Asia. Likewise, neorealists and neoliberalists’ arsenal of WWII and Cold War literature has proven to be empirically flawed when applied to Asia. The biggest anomaly is the relative stability of the region since the early 1990’s. While East Asia is under-institutionalized and interactions are characterized by intense mistrusts, it is entering the third decade of relative peace, with the most recent armed conflict occurring in 1989 between China and Vietnam over the South China Sea dispute. Historical legacies and the collapse of the USSR have created a cloud of uncertainty regarding the shape of East Asia’s security structure but have not managed to promote wars. The ability to secure East Asia in the future will depend on many factors, two of the most important being (1) the attitude of Japan toward regionalism and (2) China’ relations with weaker powers in Southeast Asia. Westphalia was heavily predicated on sovereignty, territoriality and equality as a result of constant military conquests in Europe. In the contrary, historic Asia functioned upon a strict and remarkably resilient hierarchical system until the intrusion of Western powers. Weaker countries were willing to subscribe, both rhetorically and financially, to the notion that China was the center of the universe in exchange for security. While this system was occasionally punctuated by wars, it did not exhibit nearly the degree of violent conflicts as seen in the West. The arrivals of Western imperial powers and subsequent demise of the tributary system created a big power vacuum and, more importantly, removed the only security guarantor in the region. The victory of Europe’s equal-opportunity exploitation system over East Asia’s strict hierarchy left Asian countries scrambling for an alternate interpretation of the world order.
While modern day Asian states certainly do not fancy a return to this hierarchy, the resilience of that system highlights key facts about the nature of securitization in East Asia. First, China has historically enjoyed the role of a benevolent and civilized leader to the rest of Asia. It has as much interest in stabilizing the region for ideological reasons as well as for real-politik reasons. Second, the rest of East Asia has shown the willingness to seek security and pace by appeasing larger powers in the region. Third, East Asia has never experienced a situation where more than one legitimate regional superpower exists during peacetime. The uncertainty facing how a traditionally one-party security regime should accommodate multiple powers is at the heart of issues facing international relations of East Asia.
Japan’s Relations with Great Powers and its Role in Regionalism
This uncertainty is compounded by Japan’s ambivalent attitude toward regionalism. Its tendency to avoid a leadership role has created a power vacuum which neither the U.S., for its status as a non-East-Asian country, or China, for its (current) lack of economic power, could quite assume. Japan’s role in future regionalism will heavily depend on its relations with other great powers, most notably China and the U.S.
Few East Asians could forget the events of the early 20th century. The arrival of Western imperial powers in the mid 19th century marked the rise of Japan starting with the the Meiji restoration and the demise of China starting with the Opium Wars. China’s defeats in Korea and Manchuria at the hand of Japan were even more humiliating than subjugation by Western powers because not far back Japan was just a tributary state. China was suddenly of its inferiority on all fronts, for its size, population, and virtue-based superiority were no match for the material power of a tiny island called Japan. Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1932 and full-out invasion of China in 1937 marked the height of China’s century of national humiliation. Japan’s war crimes in WW2 remain a sticking point in its relations with China. Mass killings and rape were among the many atrocious acts that Japan performed during WWII. During the Nanking Massacre alone, the Japanese Army allegedly killed 100,000-200,000 people and raped 80,000 women. Territorial disputes resulting from WWII also remain a hot topic as both countries are increasingly willing to use warships and aircraft to patrol disputed areas like the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Japan’s post-WWII alliance with the U.S. also featured prominently in major Chinese strategic considerations. Japan was a potential threat not only because of its economic might but also its strategic location. The U.S. could use these sea lanes to defend Taiwan.
Since the end of the Cold War, Sino-Japanese relations have experienced more ups and downs. Most notably, Japan’s perceived unapologetic stance for its aggression in WWII has belied its official apology and sparked tremendous protests by foreign countries. Since Class A war criminals were enshrined into the Yasukuni, several high-level Japanese politicians, including former PM Koizumi and PM Abe (before he took office), have visited the shrine on official capacity. Their visits coincided with the construction of large museum inside the shrine that glorifies that war and the approval of revisionist textbooks. Several diplomatic meetings have been cancelled as a result. Furthermore, public opinions regarding the other country have reached an all-time low in both nations. Where history has discouraged diplomatic progress, economic integration has promoted it. As the Chinese economy took off, Japan entered its lost decade. Dire economic situation caused Japanese investors to look to China. Japan has become a major foreign investor in China; only second to the U.S. Japanese trade with China between 1996 and 2006 grew by 236%. China’s trade relationship with Japan has not been as antagonistic as with the U.S. largely because their economies are more complementary, with the trade balance slightly favoring Japan. Japan’s changing domestic political landscape might also work to thaw the tension. In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan displaced the Liberal Democratic Party, who has consistently supported the U.S.-Japan security arrangement throughout its virtually uninterrupted post-WWII rule. While PM Hatoyama has expressed a desire to deepen alliance with the U.S., the Okinawa base issue and the cancellation of refueling missions in the Indian Ocean have put the alliance at risk, a development welcomed by Beijing.
Historical legacies as well as practical threats, however, have not driven Japan toward balancing against China. Instead, Japan is pursuing a strategy of hedging. Deepening economic integration with China has both practical and strategic interests. Japan has also pursued greater relations with nearby powers such as India and Australia. Since WWII, Japan has been an empirical anomaly that plagues conventional IR literature. Its defense budget has remained stable at 1% of GDP. Despite its economic might, Japan has not aimed to overtake the U.S., assumed an active leadership role in the region, nor even adopted the posture of a superpower. Despite its manufacturing and technological superiority, Japan has not rearmed or produced sophisticated offensive weapons. While Japanese popular culture has spread far and wide, its societal values are well-isolated inside Japan and its society remains relatively closed off to immigrants. The most Japan has engaged in with other countries in the region is through Foreign Direct Investments and Official Development Assistance, all of which come with virtually no political preconditions. Considering Japan’s history, it makes sense to downgrade Japan to the status of a status-quo secondary power. Japan’s insular position has kept it relatively isolated and safe from outside threats. Japan imposed a policy of self-isolation in the 17th due to the fear of being undermined by foreigners. Even its venture into World War II was largely driven by the obsession for autarky en route to maintaining national security. Its aggression during WWII should be seen as anomaly and not representative of traditional Japanese society. Unlike China, Japan has never attempted to project its power over the region for the sake of ideological influence. Instead, Japan’s foreign policies are highly motivated by pragmatic concerns.
Japan has very little reason to fear for its survival. While the rise of China is threatening, Japan’s geography, defensive capability and U.S. alliance will deter direct Chinese threats. China is therefore unlikely to feature as the top concern for Japan in the short term. Japan is more concerned with two issues: the future of U.S. alliance and constitutional revision. Both issues will have more implications for Sino-Japanese relations and regional security landscape than any unilateral policy. Many Japanese have protested the Constitution ever since it was drafted in 1946 by Allied forces. One particularly controversial issue is Article 9, which renounces the right to maintain armed forces and to use violence as a means of settling international disputes. While interpretation of Article 9 has become increasingly liberal, allowing for Japan to expand its military, its renunciation will be necessary for Japan to obtain any offensive capability. Should the Constitution be amended, it would certainly be accompanied/caused by fundamental changes in U.S.-Japan alliance. In the 1980’s, the U.S. repeatedly criticized Japan for failing to assume more burden of maintaining global security. While some of the criticism had more to do with the fact that the American economy was losing ground quickly, Japan indeed did not want to assume a more substantial role in maintain world order despite benefiting from the U.S.’s security umbrella. Ironically, Japanese statement had brought up Article 9 multiple times as an excuse for not rearming and assisting the U.S. militarily. A revision of strategic outlooks would be at the core of the forthcoming review of U.S.-Japan alliance, along with the Okinawa base issue. The outcomes of these two concerns will decide what role Japan will have in the regional order. A more independent Japan might rearm and seek a more active role in regional affairs as means of containing China and protecting its security.
Sino-ASEAN Relations
Relations between great and small powers are also an important part of the East Asian regional order, especially because North Korea, Taiwan, and the ASEAN collective have enjoyed immense leverages despite their sizes.
Relations with China are at the forefront of ASEAN leaders’ agenda and the reverse is becoming increasingly true as well. China and Southeast Asian countries have shared a mixed history of cooperation and competition and their foreign goals toward each other are not so clear-cut either. While Southeast Asian countries seek to restrain Chinese dominance over the region in the long run, they are also aware of the importance of a strong China for regional prosperity. Therefore, ASEAN states do not prefer a scenario in which there is a disruptive end to the current U.S.-China status quo. A heavy handed American attack on China regarding any number of issues like Taiwan, human rights, democratization would surely upset regional stability. An American draw-down, on the other hand, would allow China a free hand, especially in the South China Sea, where China and all but one Southeast Asian country currently lay claim.
For China, its grand strategy of avoiding conflicts while building up comprehensive national power will surely require the cooperation of Southeast Asian states. Perceiving Southeast Asia to be weak points that can be exploited by the U.S., China seeks to maintain exert its dominance over the region to make sure that these countries would generally fall in line with Chinese policies. Settling the disputes over the South China Sea also remains a top priority for China. Its history of unilateral aggression over this maritime territory has caused tensions with ASEAN countries. Vietnam recently became the latest Southeast East Asian states to acquire advanced jetfighters and submarines as a response to China’s patrolling of disputed territories in the Spratly Archipelago. Southeast Asia is also important as trade partners to China, evident in the recently operation China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.
It is not difficult to witness the delicate balance that both sides must strike to achieve the goals. For ASEAN, what is the best way of supporting a prosperous China while avoiding its future dominance? This challenge is doubly challenging because of the diverse strategic outlooks regarding China. Thailand has traditionally enjoyed the influence of China, especially during Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, while Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Indonesia and Malaysia, have always seen China as their main threats. For China, what is the best way of dominating weaker powers without allowing them to drift into the U.S.’s sphere of influence? ASEAN and Chinese interests are not completely distinct but they don’t necessarily overlap either. At the heart of this issue is an irreconcilable difference: the ability to dominate sub-regional affairs.
The relations between Southeast Asia states and China are marred by historical legacies as well. The ability to influence, and at times coerce, weaker powers in the region is both of ideological and pragmatic interests to China. Its return to superpower status would not be complete without surrounding countries’ acceptance of their inferiority to China, the same goal the tributary system was essentially designed to accomplish. As a mainland country, China’s natural sphere of influence is the Southeast Asian sub-region and without this sphere, China cannot make a legitimate claim to be a major global power. China’s early attempt to gauge their dominance was a failure as its desire to “teach Vietnam a lesson” in 1979 failed to have any impact on Vietnam’s policy in Cambodia. In fact, Vietnam remained in Cambodia for 10 years until the collapse of the USSR and internal economic turmoil forced a revision of its foreign policy agenda. Southeast Asia, on the other hand, has grown to explicitly reject external influence. Decades of subjugation by European colonial powers have sparked fierce nationalism and self-determinism. ASEAN explicitly incorporates these elements into its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Its practice, in general, has been to encourage cooperative ventures with external powers as long as they don’t have negative implications for sovereignty and regional self-determination. Despite having no formal security arrangements, ASEAN’s diplomatic culture and strongly worded collective goals regarding sovereignty serve as a power instrument to maintain regional self-determination.
The end of Cold War sparked new conditions that also affect China-ASEAN relations. While the collapse of the USSR removed the ideological polarization that has plagued Southeast Asia for decades, it also created a power vacuum, one that China was prime to assume. The draw-down of both the U.S. and USSR militarily posed serious security concerns for all Southeast Asian states, regardless of their political orientations. Furthermore, the failure of socialism as an economic model drove some countries, Vietnam the prime example, to adopt market-oriented economy. As a result, the most powerful members of ASEAN (Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore) are now directly competing with China for export markets and FDI. China and ASEAN’s economic relationships typify their love-hate relationship. While a prosperous China would provide a bigger export market for ASEAN countries in term of natural resources and commodities, its main industries cover the range of goods that encompasses all of ASEAN’s economies. Poor countries like Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are plagued by quota competitions over textile and consumer goods while Malaysia and Indonesia face the competition from cheap electronic products. China’s cheap and abundant skilled as well as non-skilled labor force give China substantial advantages over ASEAN[9]. In addition, the collapse of the USSR was a blessing in disguise for Vietnam as it was forced to accelerate economic liberalization efforts. Vietnam is now one of the fastest growing economies in the world. As Vietnam is located strategically along the its southern border, China “would never want a strong and independent Vietnam.”[10] While new conditions have arisen, the essence of ASEAN-China relations will remain the same as it was thousands of years ago, and that is the dynamics between a giant kingdom and its inferior neighbors.
Due to China’s importance in maintaining regional stability and uncertainty regarding great power relations, Southeast Asian states have been flexible in their actions. This flexibility explains some of the empirical anomalies plaguing existing security literature. First, realists have been at loss explaining why weaker states appear not to be balancing against China in the traditional sense. Southeast Asian states are neither bandwagoning with the U.S. nor balancing against China militarily through collective security arrangements. ASEAN, instead, is pursuing a strategy of hedging, or betting on multiple alternatives to avoid having to make the hard choice of balancing or bandwagoning. Such hedging consists of three prongs: deepening economic interdependence with China, engaging China in multilateral regional institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum, and subtly cultivating other powers’ help in constraining China. China’s policy toward ASEAN continues to be a mixture of appeasement and intimidation. While CAFTA is a trade policy designed to achieve the enormous economic potential of the China-Southeast Asia sub-region, it is also a mean for China to supplant Japan as the chief driver of economic growth, allowing it to project more power over Southeast Asia. China, however, continues to clamp down on any attempt to challenge its authority. Recent transgression in the Spratly Archipelago and firm support for the regime in Myanmar serve to remind ASEAN that China still remain much more of a brother than a friend.
Final Words
Historical legacies and new conditions since the end of the Cold War have created many complex issues in East Asian international relations. Among them are Japan’s future role in regionalism and Sino-ASEAN relations. There are several key observations about East Asia’s security structure. First, while China naturally aspires to the position of regional leader, Japan has been reluctant take on that position. Japan has been pragmatic in its approach to regionalism since the end of WWII and its activeness in the region will be affected more by the future of the alliance with the U.S. than China’s rising status. Second, the security structure of East Asia is not necessarily predicated on the traditional concepts security. The world’s second largest power remains happily protected by the world’s largest power. Surrounding ASEAN neighbors are not actively balancing against China. Rather, they are seeking a mixed strategy of toughness and appeasement that would unequivocally recognize China’s role as the regional hegemon but also maintaining tough stance regarding sovereignty and self-determination. Third, increasing economic interdependence in the region, such as favorable China-Japan trade relations and the recent enshrinement of CAFTA, has helped strategic goals converge. Despite seeing each other as threats, each of the three parties also realizes the benefits of cooperating in economic matters and the risk of disrupting trade relations in the region. All sides are interested in maintaining a stable regional order to promote their own economic well-beings.
The lack of genuine trusts between states, however, indicates that the security structure for East Asia would not resemble that of the European Union. States are unlikely to hand over power to a supranational entity. China should be allowed to ascend to regional leader status, for its prosperity and leadership role are important for the stability of the region. The U.S., Japan and ASEAN collectively should be able to provide a powerful counterweight to China. If history is any indication, nationalism, furnished with guns and tanks, will make countries in Southeast Asia tough obstacles to China’s desire to dominate the region. ASEAN also has high hopes in being able to incorporate China into its normative framework, which has proved to be successful in restraining Indonesia in the mid-1960’s and Vietnam in the 1980’s. Japan, with its reluctance to assume a leadership position and to pursue an independent security line, should be content as a secondary status-quo power to China as it currently is to the United States, as long as its security is guaranteed. Japan can leverage its technological and economic advantage over China to increase its regional influence. The U.S., meanwhile, should not take any active military role in the region but should continue to pledge economic support to potential allies. Its biggest goal should be to maintain the alliance with Japan.
In the short run, it is to the best of all parties’ interests to avoid any drastic strategic move. While it has modernized its military rapidly, China still does not pose a substantial threat to Japan or the ability of the U.S. to project power in East Asia. Therefore, China will be interested in maintaining a peaceful regional environment, thereby allowing it to continue modernization without the risk of setting off an arms race in the region. Whether China will be able to maintain this breath-taking pace given its social and political problems, however, is a separate issue. The Japan-U.S. alliance, in the short run, is also beneficial to all parties. For China, it keeps Japan from needing to develop an independent security line that will surely involve development of sophisticated technologies and offensive capabilities. For Japan, in an ideal scenario where the Okinawa base issue could be resolved in its favor, the U.S.’s security cloud will remain unequivocally its most important security instrument. For the U.S., the benefit of having a major East Asian power as an ally is similarly invaluable not just for the ability to project power, but for the sake of having on less independent superpower to contain. Furthermore, the cancellation of a long standing alliance, in itself, could constitute a drastic change that might create instability in the regional environment and signal American weakness in East Asia.
In the long-run, China will be the party wanting to do away with the status-quo. In that event, an all-out containment by the U.S. on China will send regional stability tumbling. Accommodation, meanwhile, will surely bring back the image of Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Germany. The U.S. fears the loss of its ability to provide security guarantees, and thereby gaining leverages, should China dominate East Asia strategically. Both countries have actively worked to create alliances and support, especially in non-alignment countries like ASEAN members. While the belief that the U.S. is the least untrustworthy superpower is generally shared among these nations, it is highly unlikely that they will ever publicly gravitate toward one power or another. Rather, ASEAN countries, especially Vietnam and Thailand, will practice what they become adept at, playing superpowers off against one another. Strategically speaking, the U.S. should continue to engage these countries economically and reduce its criticisms regarding democratization or human rights. The U.S. should also implicitly acknowledge the difficulty these countries face in not having the ability to make concrete security commitments because of their geographical proximity to China. Despite the possibility that the U.S. could get exploited because it would be providing benefits in return for no concrete security commitments, the U.S.’s backing will allow ASEAN countries to maintain a tougher posture and ensure that public perception of the U.S. will remain higher than that of China, which has generally been ill-received by the ultra-nationalist population of these countries.
While modern day Asian states certainly do not fancy a return to this hierarchy, the resilience of that system highlights key facts about the nature of securitization in East Asia. First, China has historically enjoyed the role of a benevolent and civilized leader to the rest of Asia. It has as much interest in stabilizing the region for ideological reasons as well as for real-politik reasons. Second, the rest of East Asia has shown the willingness to seek security and pace by appeasing larger powers in the region. Third, East Asia has never experienced a situation where more than one legitimate regional superpower exists during peacetime. The uncertainty facing how a traditionally one-party security regime should accommodate multiple powers is at the heart of issues facing international relations of East Asia.
Japan’s Relations with Great Powers and its Role in Regionalism
This uncertainty is compounded by Japan’s ambivalent attitude toward regionalism. Its tendency to avoid a leadership role has created a power vacuum which neither the U.S., for its status as a non-East-Asian country, or China, for its (current) lack of economic power, could quite assume. Japan’s role in future regionalism will heavily depend on its relations with other great powers, most notably China and the U.S.
Few East Asians could forget the events of the early 20th century. The arrival of Western imperial powers in the mid 19th century marked the rise of Japan starting with the the Meiji restoration and the demise of China starting with the Opium Wars. China’s defeats in Korea and Manchuria at the hand of Japan were even more humiliating than subjugation by Western powers because not far back Japan was just a tributary state. China was suddenly of its inferiority on all fronts, for its size, population, and virtue-based superiority were no match for the material power of a tiny island called Japan. Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1932 and full-out invasion of China in 1937 marked the height of China’s century of national humiliation. Japan’s war crimes in WW2 remain a sticking point in its relations with China. Mass killings and rape were among the many atrocious acts that Japan performed during WWII. During the Nanking Massacre alone, the Japanese Army allegedly killed 100,000-200,000 people and raped 80,000 women. Territorial disputes resulting from WWII also remain a hot topic as both countries are increasingly willing to use warships and aircraft to patrol disputed areas like the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Japan’s post-WWII alliance with the U.S. also featured prominently in major Chinese strategic considerations. Japan was a potential threat not only because of its economic might but also its strategic location. The U.S. could use these sea lanes to defend Taiwan.
Since the end of the Cold War, Sino-Japanese relations have experienced more ups and downs. Most notably, Japan’s perceived unapologetic stance for its aggression in WWII has belied its official apology and sparked tremendous protests by foreign countries. Since Class A war criminals were enshrined into the Yasukuni, several high-level Japanese politicians, including former PM Koizumi and PM Abe (before he took office), have visited the shrine on official capacity. Their visits coincided with the construction of large museum inside the shrine that glorifies that war and the approval of revisionist textbooks. Several diplomatic meetings have been cancelled as a result. Furthermore, public opinions regarding the other country have reached an all-time low in both nations. Where history has discouraged diplomatic progress, economic integration has promoted it. As the Chinese economy took off, Japan entered its lost decade. Dire economic situation caused Japanese investors to look to China. Japan has become a major foreign investor in China; only second to the U.S. Japanese trade with China between 1996 and 2006 grew by 236%. China’s trade relationship with Japan has not been as antagonistic as with the U.S. largely because their economies are more complementary, with the trade balance slightly favoring Japan. Japan’s changing domestic political landscape might also work to thaw the tension. In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan displaced the Liberal Democratic Party, who has consistently supported the U.S.-Japan security arrangement throughout its virtually uninterrupted post-WWII rule. While PM Hatoyama has expressed a desire to deepen alliance with the U.S., the Okinawa base issue and the cancellation of refueling missions in the Indian Ocean have put the alliance at risk, a development welcomed by Beijing.
Historical legacies as well as practical threats, however, have not driven Japan toward balancing against China. Instead, Japan is pursuing a strategy of hedging. Deepening economic integration with China has both practical and strategic interests. Japan has also pursued greater relations with nearby powers such as India and Australia. Since WWII, Japan has been an empirical anomaly that plagues conventional IR literature. Its defense budget has remained stable at 1% of GDP. Despite its economic might, Japan has not aimed to overtake the U.S., assumed an active leadership role in the region, nor even adopted the posture of a superpower. Despite its manufacturing and technological superiority, Japan has not rearmed or produced sophisticated offensive weapons. While Japanese popular culture has spread far and wide, its societal values are well-isolated inside Japan and its society remains relatively closed off to immigrants. The most Japan has engaged in with other countries in the region is through Foreign Direct Investments and Official Development Assistance, all of which come with virtually no political preconditions. Considering Japan’s history, it makes sense to downgrade Japan to the status of a status-quo secondary power. Japan’s insular position has kept it relatively isolated and safe from outside threats. Japan imposed a policy of self-isolation in the 17th due to the fear of being undermined by foreigners. Even its venture into World War II was largely driven by the obsession for autarky en route to maintaining national security. Its aggression during WWII should be seen as anomaly and not representative of traditional Japanese society. Unlike China, Japan has never attempted to project its power over the region for the sake of ideological influence. Instead, Japan’s foreign policies are highly motivated by pragmatic concerns.
Japan has very little reason to fear for its survival. While the rise of China is threatening, Japan’s geography, defensive capability and U.S. alliance will deter direct Chinese threats. China is therefore unlikely to feature as the top concern for Japan in the short term. Japan is more concerned with two issues: the future of U.S. alliance and constitutional revision. Both issues will have more implications for Sino-Japanese relations and regional security landscape than any unilateral policy. Many Japanese have protested the Constitution ever since it was drafted in 1946 by Allied forces. One particularly controversial issue is Article 9, which renounces the right to maintain armed forces and to use violence as a means of settling international disputes. While interpretation of Article 9 has become increasingly liberal, allowing for Japan to expand its military, its renunciation will be necessary for Japan to obtain any offensive capability. Should the Constitution be amended, it would certainly be accompanied/caused by fundamental changes in U.S.-Japan alliance. In the 1980’s, the U.S. repeatedly criticized Japan for failing to assume more burden of maintaining global security. While some of the criticism had more to do with the fact that the American economy was losing ground quickly, Japan indeed did not want to assume a more substantial role in maintain world order despite benefiting from the U.S.’s security umbrella. Ironically, Japanese statement had brought up Article 9 multiple times as an excuse for not rearming and assisting the U.S. militarily. A revision of strategic outlooks would be at the core of the forthcoming review of U.S.-Japan alliance, along with the Okinawa base issue. The outcomes of these two concerns will decide what role Japan will have in the regional order. A more independent Japan might rearm and seek a more active role in regional affairs as means of containing China and protecting its security.
Sino-ASEAN Relations
Relations between great and small powers are also an important part of the East Asian regional order, especially because North Korea, Taiwan, and the ASEAN collective have enjoyed immense leverages despite their sizes.
Relations with China are at the forefront of ASEAN leaders’ agenda and the reverse is becoming increasingly true as well. China and Southeast Asian countries have shared a mixed history of cooperation and competition and their foreign goals toward each other are not so clear-cut either. While Southeast Asian countries seek to restrain Chinese dominance over the region in the long run, they are also aware of the importance of a strong China for regional prosperity. Therefore, ASEAN states do not prefer a scenario in which there is a disruptive end to the current U.S.-China status quo. A heavy handed American attack on China regarding any number of issues like Taiwan, human rights, democratization would surely upset regional stability. An American draw-down, on the other hand, would allow China a free hand, especially in the South China Sea, where China and all but one Southeast Asian country currently lay claim.
For China, its grand strategy of avoiding conflicts while building up comprehensive national power will surely require the cooperation of Southeast Asian states. Perceiving Southeast Asia to be weak points that can be exploited by the U.S., China seeks to maintain exert its dominance over the region to make sure that these countries would generally fall in line with Chinese policies. Settling the disputes over the South China Sea also remains a top priority for China. Its history of unilateral aggression over this maritime territory has caused tensions with ASEAN countries. Vietnam recently became the latest Southeast East Asian states to acquire advanced jetfighters and submarines as a response to China’s patrolling of disputed territories in the Spratly Archipelago. Southeast Asia is also important as trade partners to China, evident in the recently operation China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.
It is not difficult to witness the delicate balance that both sides must strike to achieve the goals. For ASEAN, what is the best way of supporting a prosperous China while avoiding its future dominance? This challenge is doubly challenging because of the diverse strategic outlooks regarding China. Thailand has traditionally enjoyed the influence of China, especially during Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, while Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Indonesia and Malaysia, have always seen China as their main threats. For China, what is the best way of dominating weaker powers without allowing them to drift into the U.S.’s sphere of influence? ASEAN and Chinese interests are not completely distinct but they don’t necessarily overlap either. At the heart of this issue is an irreconcilable difference: the ability to dominate sub-regional affairs.
The relations between Southeast Asia states and China are marred by historical legacies as well. The ability to influence, and at times coerce, weaker powers in the region is both of ideological and pragmatic interests to China. Its return to superpower status would not be complete without surrounding countries’ acceptance of their inferiority to China, the same goal the tributary system was essentially designed to accomplish. As a mainland country, China’s natural sphere of influence is the Southeast Asian sub-region and without this sphere, China cannot make a legitimate claim to be a major global power. China’s early attempt to gauge their dominance was a failure as its desire to “teach Vietnam a lesson” in 1979 failed to have any impact on Vietnam’s policy in Cambodia. In fact, Vietnam remained in Cambodia for 10 years until the collapse of the USSR and internal economic turmoil forced a revision of its foreign policy agenda. Southeast Asia, on the other hand, has grown to explicitly reject external influence. Decades of subjugation by European colonial powers have sparked fierce nationalism and self-determinism. ASEAN explicitly incorporates these elements into its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Its practice, in general, has been to encourage cooperative ventures with external powers as long as they don’t have negative implications for sovereignty and regional self-determination. Despite having no formal security arrangements, ASEAN’s diplomatic culture and strongly worded collective goals regarding sovereignty serve as a power instrument to maintain regional self-determination.
The end of Cold War sparked new conditions that also affect China-ASEAN relations. While the collapse of the USSR removed the ideological polarization that has plagued Southeast Asia for decades, it also created a power vacuum, one that China was prime to assume. The draw-down of both the U.S. and USSR militarily posed serious security concerns for all Southeast Asian states, regardless of their political orientations. Furthermore, the failure of socialism as an economic model drove some countries, Vietnam the prime example, to adopt market-oriented economy. As a result, the most powerful members of ASEAN (Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore) are now directly competing with China for export markets and FDI. China and ASEAN’s economic relationships typify their love-hate relationship. While a prosperous China would provide a bigger export market for ASEAN countries in term of natural resources and commodities, its main industries cover the range of goods that encompasses all of ASEAN’s economies. Poor countries like Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are plagued by quota competitions over textile and consumer goods while Malaysia and Indonesia face the competition from cheap electronic products. China’s cheap and abundant skilled as well as non-skilled labor force give China substantial advantages over ASEAN[9]. In addition, the collapse of the USSR was a blessing in disguise for Vietnam as it was forced to accelerate economic liberalization efforts. Vietnam is now one of the fastest growing economies in the world. As Vietnam is located strategically along the its southern border, China “would never want a strong and independent Vietnam.”[10] While new conditions have arisen, the essence of ASEAN-China relations will remain the same as it was thousands of years ago, and that is the dynamics between a giant kingdom and its inferior neighbors.
Due to China’s importance in maintaining regional stability and uncertainty regarding great power relations, Southeast Asian states have been flexible in their actions. This flexibility explains some of the empirical anomalies plaguing existing security literature. First, realists have been at loss explaining why weaker states appear not to be balancing against China in the traditional sense. Southeast Asian states are neither bandwagoning with the U.S. nor balancing against China militarily through collective security arrangements. ASEAN, instead, is pursuing a strategy of hedging, or betting on multiple alternatives to avoid having to make the hard choice of balancing or bandwagoning. Such hedging consists of three prongs: deepening economic interdependence with China, engaging China in multilateral regional institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum, and subtly cultivating other powers’ help in constraining China. China’s policy toward ASEAN continues to be a mixture of appeasement and intimidation. While CAFTA is a trade policy designed to achieve the enormous economic potential of the China-Southeast Asia sub-region, it is also a mean for China to supplant Japan as the chief driver of economic growth, allowing it to project more power over Southeast Asia. China, however, continues to clamp down on any attempt to challenge its authority. Recent transgression in the Spratly Archipelago and firm support for the regime in Myanmar serve to remind ASEAN that China still remain much more of a brother than a friend.
Final Words
Historical legacies and new conditions since the end of the Cold War have created many complex issues in East Asian international relations. Among them are Japan’s future role in regionalism and Sino-ASEAN relations. There are several key observations about East Asia’s security structure. First, while China naturally aspires to the position of regional leader, Japan has been reluctant take on that position. Japan has been pragmatic in its approach to regionalism since the end of WWII and its activeness in the region will be affected more by the future of the alliance with the U.S. than China’s rising status. Second, the security structure of East Asia is not necessarily predicated on the traditional concepts security. The world’s second largest power remains happily protected by the world’s largest power. Surrounding ASEAN neighbors are not actively balancing against China. Rather, they are seeking a mixed strategy of toughness and appeasement that would unequivocally recognize China’s role as the regional hegemon but also maintaining tough stance regarding sovereignty and self-determination. Third, increasing economic interdependence in the region, such as favorable China-Japan trade relations and the recent enshrinement of CAFTA, has helped strategic goals converge. Despite seeing each other as threats, each of the three parties also realizes the benefits of cooperating in economic matters and the risk of disrupting trade relations in the region. All sides are interested in maintaining a stable regional order to promote their own economic well-beings.
The lack of genuine trusts between states, however, indicates that the security structure for East Asia would not resemble that of the European Union. States are unlikely to hand over power to a supranational entity. China should be allowed to ascend to regional leader status, for its prosperity and leadership role are important for the stability of the region. The U.S., Japan and ASEAN collectively should be able to provide a powerful counterweight to China. If history is any indication, nationalism, furnished with guns and tanks, will make countries in Southeast Asia tough obstacles to China’s desire to dominate the region. ASEAN also has high hopes in being able to incorporate China into its normative framework, which has proved to be successful in restraining Indonesia in the mid-1960’s and Vietnam in the 1980’s. Japan, with its reluctance to assume a leadership position and to pursue an independent security line, should be content as a secondary status-quo power to China as it currently is to the United States, as long as its security is guaranteed. Japan can leverage its technological and economic advantage over China to increase its regional influence. The U.S., meanwhile, should not take any active military role in the region but should continue to pledge economic support to potential allies. Its biggest goal should be to maintain the alliance with Japan.
In the short run, it is to the best of all parties’ interests to avoid any drastic strategic move. While it has modernized its military rapidly, China still does not pose a substantial threat to Japan or the ability of the U.S. to project power in East Asia. Therefore, China will be interested in maintaining a peaceful regional environment, thereby allowing it to continue modernization without the risk of setting off an arms race in the region. Whether China will be able to maintain this breath-taking pace given its social and political problems, however, is a separate issue. The Japan-U.S. alliance, in the short run, is also beneficial to all parties. For China, it keeps Japan from needing to develop an independent security line that will surely involve development of sophisticated technologies and offensive capabilities. For Japan, in an ideal scenario where the Okinawa base issue could be resolved in its favor, the U.S.’s security cloud will remain unequivocally its most important security instrument. For the U.S., the benefit of having a major East Asian power as an ally is similarly invaluable not just for the ability to project power, but for the sake of having on less independent superpower to contain. Furthermore, the cancellation of a long standing alliance, in itself, could constitute a drastic change that might create instability in the regional environment and signal American weakness in East Asia.
In the long-run, China will be the party wanting to do away with the status-quo. In that event, an all-out containment by the U.S. on China will send regional stability tumbling. Accommodation, meanwhile, will surely bring back the image of Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of Germany. The U.S. fears the loss of its ability to provide security guarantees, and thereby gaining leverages, should China dominate East Asia strategically. Both countries have actively worked to create alliances and support, especially in non-alignment countries like ASEAN members. While the belief that the U.S. is the least untrustworthy superpower is generally shared among these nations, it is highly unlikely that they will ever publicly gravitate toward one power or another. Rather, ASEAN countries, especially Vietnam and Thailand, will practice what they become adept at, playing superpowers off against one another. Strategically speaking, the U.S. should continue to engage these countries economically and reduce its criticisms regarding democratization or human rights. The U.S. should also implicitly acknowledge the difficulty these countries face in not having the ability to make concrete security commitments because of their geographical proximity to China. Despite the possibility that the U.S. could get exploited because it would be providing benefits in return for no concrete security commitments, the U.S.’s backing will allow ASEAN countries to maintain a tougher posture and ensure that public perception of the U.S. will remain higher than that of China, which has generally been ill-received by the ultra-nationalist population of these countries.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
