The war in Afghanistan, which flew under the radar after the quick and successful invasion by U.S. forces in 2001, has reappeared front and center on President Obama’s foreign agenda. The Vietnam-Afghanistan comparison has become a favorite topic of armchair politicians. Parallels between the conflicts certainly exist: the nature of warfare, the corrupt U.S.-backed regimes, and the wars’ unpopularity in the U.S. The question of whether Afghanistan is the new Vietnam, however, is irrelevant. The real challenge for policy makers is to examine the roots of their similarities in order to find a potential solution to the situation in Afghanistan.
Two aspects of the Vietnam conflict are particularly relevant to Afghanistan today: American support for an unpopular regime and irresponsible reconstruction spending. A motivation for U.S. intervention in Vietnam was the desire to bolster America’s reputation as a champion of freedom and friend to democracy, yet the U.S. ended up sponsoring one of the most corrupt and authoritarian regimes in recent history. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem declared himself President of Vietnam after winning 600,000 out of 400,000 possible votes. He later won uncontested re-election after two candidates refused American bribes to stand in and create the appearance of legitimacy. Diem was eventually assassinated in a coup tacitly approved by the U.S. In sponsoring an authoritarian regime and later providing implicit support for a coup d’etat against it, the U.S. undermined the viability of subsequent governments and undercut the legitimacy of its intervention in Vietnam.
Another U.S. goal, pacifying Vietnam through economic prosperity, also failed spectacularly. Billions of dollars were poured into Saigon at the expense of rural areas, the very places where American forces needed to win hearts and minds. Traditional businesses were abandoned by Vietnamese civilians in favor of prostitution and drug trafficking. Key industries like agriculture were so woefully ignored by the administration that starting in 1965, South Vietnam actually became a rice importer.
The situation in Afghanistan has similar characteristics. Both Afghanistan and Vietnam were distant, small, and impoverished nations that posed little external threat to the United States. The Karzai administration, like Diem’s, is plagued by corruption, fraudulent elections, and unpopularity. Both administrations depended heavily on American aid, but openly defied American recommendations in order to avoid being branded puppet regimes. American airstrikes have killed many civilians in Afghanistan, in much the same way that Agent Orange devastated South Vietnam. Finally, like in Vietnam, narcotics production is a major industry in Afghanistan. After the 2001 invasion, Afghanistan quickly regained its status as the world’s largest opium producer.
The main distinction between Vietnam and Afghanistan, one that is a blessing for the U.S., is the nature of the resistance. Ho Chi Minh was a charismatic figure fighting for national independence, a cause even his enemies found difficult to criticize. Had Diem not blocked the 1956 election out of fear of losing, Ho would have won by a landslide. The Taliban, however, do not enjoy similar support. Their tyrannical rule was widely unpopular, and their cruel treatment of women, bombing of public facilities, and use of schools as military barracks angered both ordinary Afghans and other extremist factions.
The Obama administration can capitalize on the Taliban’s weakness and win the support of the Afghan people by delivering on nation-building promises. Economic and political failures are the main reasons that natives have turned to the Taliban. Afghanistan does not lack natural resources, foreign aid, or manpower. What it lacks is a competent government capable of using those resources. The U.S. should make a firm and credible threat to withdraw help in all forms if the Karzai administration continues to underperform.
Critics may argue such a strategy will strengthen the Taliban, but history has shown that there is much more to be lost if the U.S. continues to be soft on the Afghan government. The Karzai administration, like that of Diem, could become completely dependent on the U.S., and yet remain unwilling to implement its advice. This would gradually give the Taliban even more momentum than they would gain from the U.S. cutting out Karzai today.
Just as the Vietnamese frowned upon Kennedy’s “relief workers” program, Afghans will not trust nation-building efforts if every American is armed with an M16. In order to foster legitimacy for nation-building, the U.S. needs to focus on training Afghan forces to defend themselves. When Afghan forces are able to stabilize regions without significant American support, they will earn popular legitimacy and improve morale, both important developments for their long-term struggle with the Taliban. Training a primitive army like that of Afghanistan will be difficult, but this task is made easier by the Taliban’s unpopularity and the lessons the U.S. learned training the South Vietnamese security force. U.S. personnel must demonstrate respect, compassion, and a willingness to learn and understand the Afghan culture in order to succeed in their efforts.
In hindsight, American foreign policies in Vietnam were incoherent and lacked a well thought-out strategy. The U.S. limped into Vietnam hoping for a quick victory, but as soon as that proved impossible, its entire agenda collapsed. Where the U.S. had clear goals, like winning hearts and minds, shoddy execution and an ignorance of local culture derailed them. The U.S. was fighting with scare tactics and hypocritical policies, which were exposed by a tough-minded and risk-tolerant opposition. For years, policy makers scrambled for quick fixes and honorable exits. President Obama must avoid these pitfalls by crafting a feasible long-term strategy in Afghanistan.
Deploying more troops seems unsustainable. The U.S. will have to fight a war of attrition with the American public as its own worst enemy. The North Vietnamese were willing to risk an inordinate amount of casualties in order to achieve their objective, and the Taliban’s suicide bombings show that they are capable of the same. In contrast, Americans’ casualty aversion is simply too great for the U.S. military to play the same kind of game.
Deploying additional troops, even for security purposes, will merely lead to a vicious cycle of resistance and reinforcement. Consider that in order to protect ground troops, the U.S. relies heavily on air strikes from high altitude that inevitably affect civilians. Rising civilian hostility coupled with failed nation-building efforts strengthen the Taliban and embolden them to stage attacks against American installations, which then precipitate further troop increases and perpetuate the cycle.
President Obama inherited a mess in Afghanistan but also an opportunity to right the course. He should reject the temptation to deploy more troops and instead focus on rebuilding the economic and political infrastructure of Afghanistan. Building a free and prosperous Afghanistan will undermine the reason for the Taliban’s existence and hopefully conclude the conflict with minimal loss of life.
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
On Crisis Management in Southeast Asia
While men are busy killing each other via roadside bombs and genocide, nature is quietly carrying out the same task, albeit in a far more frequent and deadly manner. The series of natural disasters that hit Southeast Asia in late September, which included two super-typhoons and two mega-earthquakes, reaffirms this chilling fact. Over a thousand people were killed and billions of dollars were lost in property damages. While these disasters will undoubtedly hurt the economy in the immediate future, the long-term effects are less apparent. The link between disaster unpreparedness and political structure suggests that these disasters would necessitate very little, if any, major political, economic or social changes in these countries.
Experience is a great teacher
The United Nations estimates that in 2008 alone the world lost 236,000 lives and $186 billion dollars in over 300 natural disasters. Statistics shows that 60% of the world’s natural disasters occurred in Southeast Asia (Source: Canadian TV), while Asia accounted for 90% of human displacement (Source: UN) due to these events. One of the deadliest disasters in history took place just 5 years ago in this region, when a 9.3 undersea earthquake unleashed a tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of people in one stroke. With the memory of such devastating events fresh in minds, one would expect disaster-prone countries to be more prepared for future disasters. In a sense, this is true. International as well as local groups have consistently improved their disaster-response teams in the region (Source: Wall Street). For example, Red Cross has rebuilt 5,500 earthquake-resistant homes in Indonesia since the disaster and trained 1,200 volunteers in disasters relief (Source: Canadian TV). However, most of these improvements are post-facto relief measures while the most pressing needs, prevention efforts and early detections, are woefully ignored.
So why haven’t they learned?
This problem on the surface can be easily blamed on technological inadequacy and underdeveloped infrastructure. Weather bureau officials of the Philippines admitted that they had a very small number of radar stations to track, on average, the twenty typhoons that approach the country annually (Source: alertnet.org). Primitive, outdated and aging infrastructures in these developing countries are exposed in the face of natural disasters, causing news to reach remote areas more slowly and evacuation efforts to be stalled. Thailand’s recent tsunami evacuation drill failed spectacularly because the alerts from the 79 warning towers did not reach all villagers (Source: foxnews.com). However, this is not entirely responsible for the fact that Southeast Asia is seemingly unprepared every time a disaster hits. Most major disasters can be and are forecasted well in advanced so while the lack of physical infrastructure is a limiting factor, the root of this problem is the underlying political structures of these countries.
Whose fault is it really?
Addressing the lack of early actions requires political changes. The real problem lies in bureaucratic incompetence, lacks of accountability and insufficient commitment to environmental problems. The first two issues can be easily seen in Vietnam’s typhoon forecast debacle. A party leader in Quang Ngai province, one of the areas hit hardest by Typhoon Ketsana, blamed his province’s unpreparedness on inaccurate forecasts by the National Center for Hydrometerological Forecasting. The Center demurred, saying that notices released by the national center as well as the local center all included Quang Ngai as a potential region. Regardless of the truth, Quang Ngai leaders were at fault for their failure to prepare for the worst-case scenario, and their subsequent failure to evacuate the villagers in a timely manner. Chief of the Quang Ngai’s Steering Board for Flood and Storm Control Truong Ngoc Nhi later said: “It is unnecessary to find who is wrong and who is right but it is more important to deal with losses and stabilize the lives of the local residents.” (Source: Vietnam News). This highlights the buck passing practice all too common in the Vietnamese government: officials deflect the blame and downplay the need for accountability when the blame falls on them. Without accountability, incompetence cannot be corrected. Without competent officials, more people will die.
The most depressing fact, however, is a lack of genuine commitment to disaster prevention. In 2004, the military junta of Myanmar actually blocked foreign aid to disasters of Cyclone Nargis. While governments of other Southeast Asian countries have never gone to such extreme, very little money has been dedicated to improving disaster detection systems. The government of the Philippines came under criticism for spending billions of pesos on questionable activities (foreign visits by officials, presidential dinners abroad, campaign contribution, etc…) and yet only two rubber boats could immediately be provided to rescue victims in Marikina, which is flooded every year by the Marikina River. The same applies to Central Vietnam, which faces floods and typhoons nine months out of the year. Even more frightening is that Phuket, a popular tourist destination in Thailand, is dependent on a buoy running on backup battery power for warnings of incoming tsunamis (Source: foxnews.com).
Will they ever learn?
On the surface, these disasters provide ample support for changes. But as mentioned, these are not easy technological changes, but difficult political changes, namely improved performance, accountability and different political agendas that might directly conflict with the authoritarian nature of these governments. Are Southeast Asian governments willing to make tough changes to save precious human lives? As of now, the answer seems to be an astounding no. While the most recent disasters are very destructive, they are relatively minor in comparison to the history of natural disasters in Southeast Asia, both in terms of human tolls and property damages. The 2004 tsunami killed almost 200,000 in Southeast Asia and cost billions of dollars. The regions affected by recent earthquakes in Indonesia, on the other hand, only account for 3% of its annual GDP. The Philippines’s agricultural structure was spared, while the rest of the affected businesses could still operate as long as the phone lines are functional. In fact, some economies might even benefit from these disasters in the long run because blossoming construction sectors generally have an accelerating effect on GDP, evident in Taiwan’s improved economy thanks to rebuilding areas hit by Typhoon Morakot. (Source: Barclay and Bloomberg). These disasters will compel Southeast Asian leaders to at least consider accelerating the process of economic integration and environmental cooperation, and to devote more resources of handling future natural disasters. However, Southeast Asia has witnessed plenty of similar disasters before and therefore it is unlikely that these governments will undertake any dramatic and fundamental changes to their internal political and economic structures.
Experience is a great teacher
The United Nations estimates that in 2008 alone the world lost 236,000 lives and $186 billion dollars in over 300 natural disasters. Statistics shows that 60% of the world’s natural disasters occurred in Southeast Asia (Source: Canadian TV), while Asia accounted for 90% of human displacement (Source: UN) due to these events. One of the deadliest disasters in history took place just 5 years ago in this region, when a 9.3 undersea earthquake unleashed a tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of people in one stroke. With the memory of such devastating events fresh in minds, one would expect disaster-prone countries to be more prepared for future disasters. In a sense, this is true. International as well as local groups have consistently improved their disaster-response teams in the region (Source: Wall Street). For example, Red Cross has rebuilt 5,500 earthquake-resistant homes in Indonesia since the disaster and trained 1,200 volunteers in disasters relief (Source: Canadian TV). However, most of these improvements are post-facto relief measures while the most pressing needs, prevention efforts and early detections, are woefully ignored.
So why haven’t they learned?
This problem on the surface can be easily blamed on technological inadequacy and underdeveloped infrastructure. Weather bureau officials of the Philippines admitted that they had a very small number of radar stations to track, on average, the twenty typhoons that approach the country annually (Source: alertnet.org). Primitive, outdated and aging infrastructures in these developing countries are exposed in the face of natural disasters, causing news to reach remote areas more slowly and evacuation efforts to be stalled. Thailand’s recent tsunami evacuation drill failed spectacularly because the alerts from the 79 warning towers did not reach all villagers (Source: foxnews.com). However, this is not entirely responsible for the fact that Southeast Asia is seemingly unprepared every time a disaster hits. Most major disasters can be and are forecasted well in advanced so while the lack of physical infrastructure is a limiting factor, the root of this problem is the underlying political structures of these countries.
Whose fault is it really?
Addressing the lack of early actions requires political changes. The real problem lies in bureaucratic incompetence, lacks of accountability and insufficient commitment to environmental problems. The first two issues can be easily seen in Vietnam’s typhoon forecast debacle. A party leader in Quang Ngai province, one of the areas hit hardest by Typhoon Ketsana, blamed his province’s unpreparedness on inaccurate forecasts by the National Center for Hydrometerological Forecasting. The Center demurred, saying that notices released by the national center as well as the local center all included Quang Ngai as a potential region. Regardless of the truth, Quang Ngai leaders were at fault for their failure to prepare for the worst-case scenario, and their subsequent failure to evacuate the villagers in a timely manner. Chief of the Quang Ngai’s Steering Board for Flood and Storm Control Truong Ngoc Nhi later said: “It is unnecessary to find who is wrong and who is right but it is more important to deal with losses and stabilize the lives of the local residents.” (Source: Vietnam News). This highlights the buck passing practice all too common in the Vietnamese government: officials deflect the blame and downplay the need for accountability when the blame falls on them. Without accountability, incompetence cannot be corrected. Without competent officials, more people will die.
The most depressing fact, however, is a lack of genuine commitment to disaster prevention. In 2004, the military junta of Myanmar actually blocked foreign aid to disasters of Cyclone Nargis. While governments of other Southeast Asian countries have never gone to such extreme, very little money has been dedicated to improving disaster detection systems. The government of the Philippines came under criticism for spending billions of pesos on questionable activities (foreign visits by officials, presidential dinners abroad, campaign contribution, etc…) and yet only two rubber boats could immediately be provided to rescue victims in Marikina, which is flooded every year by the Marikina River. The same applies to Central Vietnam, which faces floods and typhoons nine months out of the year. Even more frightening is that Phuket, a popular tourist destination in Thailand, is dependent on a buoy running on backup battery power for warnings of incoming tsunamis (Source: foxnews.com).
Will they ever learn?
On the surface, these disasters provide ample support for changes. But as mentioned, these are not easy technological changes, but difficult political changes, namely improved performance, accountability and different political agendas that might directly conflict with the authoritarian nature of these governments. Are Southeast Asian governments willing to make tough changes to save precious human lives? As of now, the answer seems to be an astounding no. While the most recent disasters are very destructive, they are relatively minor in comparison to the history of natural disasters in Southeast Asia, both in terms of human tolls and property damages. The 2004 tsunami killed almost 200,000 in Southeast Asia and cost billions of dollars. The regions affected by recent earthquakes in Indonesia, on the other hand, only account for 3% of its annual GDP. The Philippines’s agricultural structure was spared, while the rest of the affected businesses could still operate as long as the phone lines are functional. In fact, some economies might even benefit from these disasters in the long run because blossoming construction sectors generally have an accelerating effect on GDP, evident in Taiwan’s improved economy thanks to rebuilding areas hit by Typhoon Morakot. (Source: Barclay and Bloomberg). These disasters will compel Southeast Asian leaders to at least consider accelerating the process of economic integration and environmental cooperation, and to devote more resources of handling future natural disasters. However, Southeast Asia has witnessed plenty of similar disasters before and therefore it is unlikely that these governments will undertake any dramatic and fundamental changes to their internal political and economic structures.
Saturday, October 10, 2009
Lessons of the War
Born and raised under the care of a Confucian scholar, Ho Chi Minh harbored nationalistic feelings long before he turned to Communism. Expelled from school for demonstrating against the French colonial administration, Ho Chi Minh left Vietnam for France, working as kitchen helper on the Amiral Latouche-Tréville. His true motive for leaving Vietnam was unknown, though Vietnamese textbooks touted that their spiritual father set out to free Vietnam from French rule. During his years in France, Ho Chi Minh undertook various menial jobs while educating himself in Western political theories. After World War I, Ho Chi Minh petitioned President Woodrow Wilson for the colonies' rights of self-determination. Wilson's 14-point plan fell through in the US Senate and Ho Chi Minh's petition subsequently fell to deaf ears. This was when Ho Chi Minh gravitated to Communism. He went on to become a founding member of the French Communist Party and Intercolonial Union. He also founded the Revolutionary Youth League, a precursor of the Indochinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam in the 1940's to lead the national resistance against the Japanese, French and American. His power and health dwindled in the 1960's but he remains the nation's most sacred figure and spritual father until today.
Little is known about this shadowy and complex figure. While Ho Chi Minh has been labeled by many as a communist, an agitator and a puppet, historians generally agree that he was first and foremost a patriot motivated by independence for his homeland. A pragmatist constrained by constant internal bickering, external meddling as well as the inherent difficulty of institutionalizing communism, Ho Chi Minh has largely failed to achieve his true vision of Vietnam. Lost in the bloodshed and brutality of the war was his ideology, the bastard child of Vietnamese's Neo-Confucianism and Western liberalism. Ho Chi Minh chose a wise course for a small and feeble nation like Vietnam, not only in war but also in peace. He was not a pioneer, but rather a skillful diplomat who understood a few important points about Vietnam's history, values and place in the world.
First, the millenia-old struggles for independence showed the importance of popular support. Demonstrated both in popular uprisings, those of Quang Trung, the Trung Sisters, and the Tay Son brothers, as well as Confucian values and folklores, people only rise up to support those rulers worthy of respect and sympathetic to their cause. Weapons and technology cannot outlast the will of millions of people. The Vietminh's rise from a pathetic guerrilla force to a modern conventional army could not be completed without the backing of millions of Vietnamese peasants. When they weren't sacrificing lives, they provided food, shelter and morale boost to those who were. Later in the war, these same peasants traversed thousands of miles along the Ho Chi Minh trail to resupply Southern comrades. These voluntary sacrifices are almost unprecedented in world history and they stem not from nationalism, for there were non-Communist nationalist forces in Vietnam, but rather from the public trust earned by the Vietminh after years of supporting peasants' causes. The moral of the lesson is, in war or peace, national success and popular support go hand in hand.
Secondly, the unfortunate status of Vietnam as a small and weak country, both militarily and economically, necessarily dictates that it be wise in foreign policies. There is not a better illustration of this than the Vietnam War. Having simultaneously fought and befriended four out of five members on the UN permanent security council, Vietnam has had its fair shares of conflicts and broken alliances. This is what Vietnam must always face. China, Russia and US will continue their tugs of war all over the world, of which Vietnam plays a key role given its geo-political position, capitalistic leaning, and penchant for Western lifestyle. Considering this, Vietnam will constantly be placed in a position of change and must be ready to modify its foreign policy stand, as it did with China, Russia and the US in the post-war period.
These two points, among others, are crucial to understand the political development of Vietnam. How will the government garner public support without allowing for a free general election? How will engaging the West affect Vietnam's relationship with China as well as its domestic political composition?
Little is known about this shadowy and complex figure. While Ho Chi Minh has been labeled by many as a communist, an agitator and a puppet, historians generally agree that he was first and foremost a patriot motivated by independence for his homeland. A pragmatist constrained by constant internal bickering, external meddling as well as the inherent difficulty of institutionalizing communism, Ho Chi Minh has largely failed to achieve his true vision of Vietnam. Lost in the bloodshed and brutality of the war was his ideology, the bastard child of Vietnamese's Neo-Confucianism and Western liberalism. Ho Chi Minh chose a wise course for a small and feeble nation like Vietnam, not only in war but also in peace. He was not a pioneer, but rather a skillful diplomat who understood a few important points about Vietnam's history, values and place in the world.
First, the millenia-old struggles for independence showed the importance of popular support. Demonstrated both in popular uprisings, those of Quang Trung, the Trung Sisters, and the Tay Son brothers, as well as Confucian values and folklores, people only rise up to support those rulers worthy of respect and sympathetic to their cause. Weapons and technology cannot outlast the will of millions of people. The Vietminh's rise from a pathetic guerrilla force to a modern conventional army could not be completed without the backing of millions of Vietnamese peasants. When they weren't sacrificing lives, they provided food, shelter and morale boost to those who were. Later in the war, these same peasants traversed thousands of miles along the Ho Chi Minh trail to resupply Southern comrades. These voluntary sacrifices are almost unprecedented in world history and they stem not from nationalism, for there were non-Communist nationalist forces in Vietnam, but rather from the public trust earned by the Vietminh after years of supporting peasants' causes. The moral of the lesson is, in war or peace, national success and popular support go hand in hand.
Secondly, the unfortunate status of Vietnam as a small and weak country, both militarily and economically, necessarily dictates that it be wise in foreign policies. There is not a better illustration of this than the Vietnam War. Having simultaneously fought and befriended four out of five members on the UN permanent security council, Vietnam has had its fair shares of conflicts and broken alliances. This is what Vietnam must always face. China, Russia and US will continue their tugs of war all over the world, of which Vietnam plays a key role given its geo-political position, capitalistic leaning, and penchant for Western lifestyle. Considering this, Vietnam will constantly be placed in a position of change and must be ready to modify its foreign policy stand, as it did with China, Russia and the US in the post-war period.
These two points, among others, are crucial to understand the political development of Vietnam. How will the government garner public support without allowing for a free general election? How will engaging the West affect Vietnam's relationship with China as well as its domestic political composition?
Tuesday, September 15, 2009
On Democratization Efforts in Vietnam
It is not unfair to say that Vietnam, a country with a rich history of military and political struggles, is once again fighting for its survival. As one of the few remaining true one-party systems in the world, Vietnam finds itself precariously balancing its political ideology with the desire for economic development and reintegration into the world. Having largely rejected its own socialist characteristics with the implementation of “Doi Moi” in 1986, the Communist party has reached a crucial crossroad where it eventually will need to face up to the real challenge of deciding its own political destiny. Will the Party elites maintain their grip on power by holding on to the current quasi-Marxist-Leninist system or will they take a back seat and let political liberalization take its course? Several domestic and international circumstances must be taken into consideration to answer this question. We first tackle the most pressings issues that will shape the political future of Vietnam: legitimacy and power balancing. In the last two sections, we take a look at the nature of current political dissent and future political reform.
On legitimacy
The first and foremost obstacle the Party faces is the problem of legitimacy. Legitimacy is the popular acceptance of a government as the legal political authority. Each regime type has a different idea of what constitutes legitimacy. For example, in constitutional monarchies, the general population accept the concept of hereditary rule and mandate of heaven as a matter of fact while in democratic countries, the ruled legitimizes the rulers through an electoral process. Lying somewhere between these two extremes, the Communist Party has traditionally employed a mix of strategies to legitimize its hold of power: Nationalism, Idealism and Eudaemonism.
Emerging from the victory over France in Dien Bien Phu as the primary agent of freedom, the Workers Party's leadership in the struggle for independence has largely sustained its legitimacy until this day. Some of the most celebrated holidays in Vietnam date back to the colonial period: Independence Day (September 2nd), Reunification Day (April 30th), Hanoi Liberation Day (October 10th). The Party takes full advantages of these historical hallmarks by reinforcing memories of its role in defeating the French and the American. Documentaries praising the bravery, ingenuity and sacrifices of party cadres are as permanent a fixture as the holidays themselves. Only three decades removed from the end of the American War, the patriotic people of Vietnam still feel very much indebted to the Party for their independence. As one party cadre with more than 50 years of service eloquently puts it: “Without the Party we would never have gotten to this point.” However, as time elapses and memories of war diminish, this form of legitimacy will gradually ebb.
After reunification in 1975, the now Communist Party of Vietnam immediately claimed sole possession of control over post-war reconstruction and development. Despite the failure to implement a functional socialist-oriented economy, the party still claims Marxist-Leninist ideology to be its core principle. In reality, much of this rhetorics is now used to legitimize the role of the Party as the guiding light of the nation. The two popular slogans “Dan Biet, Dan Ban, Dan Lam, Dan Kiem Tra” and “Dang Vien Di Truoc, Lang Nuoc Theo Sau” demonstrate the Party's attempt at establishing its power as a matter of fact. As long as Marxist-Leninist ideology remains the figurehead core principle, the Party, as the sole historical protector and interpreter of this ideology, can stake claim as the omniscient, all-knowing voice of the land. The people thus only need to know, follow and execute the parties' policies without the need to question their validity. The Party, however, will find it increasingly difficult to justify its Marxist-Leninist orientation in the face of contradicting and liberal economic policies.
The last and perhaps most important form of legitimacy is economic performance. Tremendous growth since Doi Moi has significantly increased the standing of the Party. People have been more willing to overlook shortcomings of the one-party regime as long as the economy is doing well. However, this is a two-bladed knife, as poor economic performance can also significantly hurt the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes. There is a strong correlation between the global economic crises of the 1970's/1980's and the subsequent democratization of no less than 30 third-world countries. This Third Wave of Democratization, as coined by Samuel Huntington, demonstrates that no country is insusceptible to the boom-and-bust cycles of the global economy and any non-democratic regime relying on economic performance to legitimize its power will sooner or later collapse.
Given these reasons, the Party cannot afford to underestimate the issue of legitimacy. It needs to find a system in which its existence is legitimized by the general population in one form or another. This does not necessarily imply the need for a full-fledged multi-party democracy. Electoral reform and open direct election of major positions would be a good first step toward cementing the legitimacy of the system.
On power balancing
Vietnam's size, geographic location and political orientation make it an ideal pawn in the power-balancing schemes of super powers. The only country to have fought four out of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Vietnam has had up-and-down relationships with most of the major powers in the world. The need to delicately play off one super power against each other requires Vietnam to be flexible in its political orientation and might ultimately influence its future direction.
The most pressing international issue on Vietnam's agenda is the relationship with China. The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and recent territorial conflicts underline the millennium-old tension between the two countries. The relationship, while commercially beneficial for both sides, is politically very one-sided. Vietnam has been largely unresponsive to China's takeover of Paracel and Spratly Islands, and it is hard to say that its decision to allow a Chinese mining SOE to proceed with bauxite mining in the Central Highlands was free of political pressure from the northern neighbor.
The second issue involves international pressure on Vietnam to democratize and promote human rights. Economic liberalization and integration have brought Vietnam much closer to the West. However, as access to major international organizations like WTO, World Bank, IMF often requires approvals from major Western powers, the Party is finding it difficult to avoid these sensitive issues. Because Vietnam has not made any concrete concession, democracy and human rights will undoubtedly continue to be a fixture on every negotiation table involving Vietnam and the West, especially considering the government's recent crackdown on dissidents.
The third major international partner of Vietnam is ASEAN. Founded by Phillipines, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in 1967, ASEAN has grown to include all countries in South East Asia except for East Timor. ASEAN is a major attraction for Vietnam for three reasons. First of all, it provides export markets and other economic incentives. Second of all, since most ASEAN governments are non-democratic, ASEAN provides a buffer against outside pressure on human rights and democratization. Last but not least, ASEAN's policy of non-interference ensures that Vietnam is not constrained in its handling of domestic policies. The recently ratified ASEAN Charter is widely seen as the first move toward an institutionalized regional association similar to the EU capable of negotiating on behalf of all of its members. The success of this endeavor will give Vietnam a true alliance in the international system.
Any conjecture regarding Vietnam's political future needs to take into consideration the fact that as a small and weak nation, Vietnam cannot avoid having its internal affairs influenced by super powers. Just as it took full advantages of the Sino-Soviet split, the Party will have to walk a very fine line in handling international affairs. It is hard to expect its internal composition to remain unchanged if the Party wants to continue partnering up with the West for economic development. It is equally hard to expect China to embrace a fully, or even a partially democratized Vietnam. In times to come, Vietnam might find ASEAN to be a blessing. If it grows to the regional status of the EU, ASEAN can provide a giant shield against both China and the US, allowing Vietnam to open up politically at an appropriate pace.
On political dissent
The rising number of political dissidents within Vietnam will undoubtedly have an impact on Vietnam's political future. While no event on the scale of Tienanmen Square has taken place, the government is not oblivious to the threat that political opposition poses both to the rule of the Party and the stability of the nation. There are at least 15 opposition parties in Vietnam and while considered illegal and denounced as terrorist organizations by the states, these groups continue to operate, some even publicly. Since 2006, some of these groups have coalesced into a more united and visible movement, the so-called Bloc 8406, named after the date on which their founding manifesto was signed. Bloc 8406 is composed mainly of urban professionals and religious figures, ranging from priests and Buddhists to university professors and lawyers. Its “Freedom and Democracy for Vietnam” manifesto condemns the rule of the Communist party and advocates the immediate transformation to democracy. Bloc 8406 typifies the flaws of the pro-democracy movement in Vietnam. These opposition parties suffer from lacks of long-term visions, effective organization, and most importantly a clear understanding of contemporary Vietnamese politics.
First, the central goal of establishing of a full-fledged Western multi-party democracy is flawed and unreasonable to the point of absurdity. Similar to how Phan Boi Chau courted Japan and Phan Chu Trinh flirted with French ideology, the movement fails to take into consideration the culture and political nature of its own motherland. As a heavily Confucian country that has never experienced democratic rule for 3000 years, to expect a Western style democracy to be fully functional and the people to embrace it overnight is entirely unrealistic. Just as Japan and South Korea have their own flavors of democracy, any opposition movement must seriously take Vietnamese political culture into consideration so that a democratic regime does not clash with cultural values and virtues of Vietnam.
Second, the movement continues to look to foreign politicians and overseas Vietnamese for guidance. A separate Bloc 8406 appeal brandished the signatures of 50 American senators and other Vietnamese Americans, many of whom still fly the old flag of the South Vietnamese regime. It appears that the movement is trying to lend itself more credibility in all places except for Vietnam. It is abundantly clear from the Vietnam War that the Vietnamese despise two classes of people more than anyone else: those foreigners who seek to interfere in Vietnamese domestic affairs, and those Vietnamese lackeys who provide them assistance. It is not hard to see why the government has been able to portray these opposition parties as terrorist organizations and successfully link the pro-democracy movement to the what remains of the anti-independence movement. Any pro-democracy movement that wishes to succeed must decouple itself from any external guidance, especially from organizations associated with the former South Vietnamese regime. Only Vietnamese can settle Vietnam's future.
The third problem with the pro-democracy movement is the lack of substance and direction. One of the biggest reasons the Communist Party emerged victorious from the Vietnam War is its dedication to party building. The Party established a strict hierarchy that infiltrated very single corner of society. Small cells of cadres were installed in every village, on top of which further layers of the hierarchy were built. The party had control, support, and surveillance on all different demographics: rural, urban, young, old, etc... It routinely educated and recruited non-party members. The same can hardly be said about the opposition movement. Besides handing out generic calls for democracy, it achieves little else. It almost seems like advocating for democracy has become more of a fashionable act than a movement that requires dedication and sustainability. A glaring example is the Bloc 8406 manifesto itself, which, besides declaring that “the present political regime in Vietnam [must be] changed in a fundamental way, not through incremental “renovation” steps or, even worse, through insignificant touch-ups here and there,” offer little to no blueprint as to how such goal could be accomplished. The core group of urban intellectuals and religious figures is completely disconnected from the rural farmer population that comprises the majority of Vietnamese. This was essentially why the early independence movement failed until Ho Chi Minh was able to establish an United Front of all classes and demographics. Any major revolution would require popular peasants support, as South Vietnam, and even North Vietnam during the Tet Offensive of 1968, learned the hard way. The inability to reach out and create a widespread network of support will spell defeat for the movement.
The fourth problem with the movement is the lack of a competent leading apparatus. Many parties are spearheaded by former South Vietnamese officials which hurt more then help their prospects. Current Vietnamese leaders of the movement lack the knowledge, sensibility and understanding of domestic and international political environment necessary to stage a proper revolution. To give one concrete example, Mr. Nguyen Tien Trung, the founder of the “Youth for Democracy” movement, maintains a blog in which he lists his real name, address and information about his military service that allows the authority to pin point his exact location without breaking a sweat. He has been arrested. Just like the independence movement in which it was crucial that key figures like Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh avoided arrests, the success of the pro-democracy movement relies heavily on the discipline of its leaders. Public revealing the identity of signees might have brought Bloc 8406 a modicum of credibility, but that effectively ended its operation as most of them were arrested, harassed and watched 24/7. Even when outright stupidities are not committed, carelessness can still spell the end of activists, as in the case of Lawyer Le Cong Dinh.
On Future Reform
Even a one-party regime can implement more democratic practices without adopting democracy. Liberalizing government institutions is the easiest way to do that. Undertaken in recent years, the government will need to further implement the concepts of separation of power. Compared to years past where floor debates focus on how to properly phrase certain sentences of the law, the National Assembly today is a much improvement, but its role is still minuscule compared to the enumerated powers in the Constitution. It still exists largely as the legislative arm of the Politburo, and this is unlikely to change in the future but public debates regarding key issues like bauxite mining are engaging public interest and might help to augment the role of the National Assembly. While there is not much separation of power to be had in a one party system, there can be measures to ensure the Party holds itself accountable for its policies. Questioning sessions of Ministers are a first step toward implementing more substantial checks-and-balances. The most plaguing issue, however, is the role of the judicial branch. The Supreme Court of Vietnam functions legally under the authority of the National Assembly and thus it rarely if ever rules against the Party. While Vietnam has taken legal reforms in recent years with the help of the United States, the judicial branch's largely non-existent role in daily life has undermined the power of the law.
Democracy doesn't happen overnight nor is it the magical pill that solves all ills. It is the ultimate manifestation of voluntary political openness; it cannot be forced upon those who are not ready for it. It is not an end but rather a mean of achieving a better, more civil society. It has flaws and limitations, ones that must be acknowledged and overcome. Vietnam will still face the very same problems with democracy as it is facing with communism. Officials will still be as corrupted deep down as they are today. Poverty will still be there; so will Agent Orange victims. Cities will continue to grow at the expense of rural areas. Industrialization will continue to shred the thin fabrics of morality and family ties. It's important to keep these distinctions in mind when considering democracy for Vietnam. What democracy can potential help is a better system of dealing with those problems. Not all features of democracy will apply to Vietnam; some will even hurt. Those promoting a more open political system will need to look beyond the black box that is labeled democracy and only pick out what will benefit this country. More importantly, just because a system is not working does not mean every part of it is non-functional. Socialism, despite all its flaws and shortcomings, did not become popular in Vietnam for no reason. Fundamental commitments to eradicate poverty, to maintain social-economic equality, to provide universal health-care and to main cultural virtues and values are not unique to the modern Vietnam. Both the leaders of the Communist Party and the pro-democracy movement must keep these domestic and international circumstances in mind so they can chart a middle ground that will ensure that Vietnamese politics can develop openly, stably and responsibly.
On legitimacy
The first and foremost obstacle the Party faces is the problem of legitimacy. Legitimacy is the popular acceptance of a government as the legal political authority. Each regime type has a different idea of what constitutes legitimacy. For example, in constitutional monarchies, the general population accept the concept of hereditary rule and mandate of heaven as a matter of fact while in democratic countries, the ruled legitimizes the rulers through an electoral process. Lying somewhere between these two extremes, the Communist Party has traditionally employed a mix of strategies to legitimize its hold of power: Nationalism, Idealism and Eudaemonism.
Emerging from the victory over France in Dien Bien Phu as the primary agent of freedom, the Workers Party's leadership in the struggle for independence has largely sustained its legitimacy until this day. Some of the most celebrated holidays in Vietnam date back to the colonial period: Independence Day (September 2nd), Reunification Day (April 30th), Hanoi Liberation Day (October 10th). The Party takes full advantages of these historical hallmarks by reinforcing memories of its role in defeating the French and the American. Documentaries praising the bravery, ingenuity and sacrifices of party cadres are as permanent a fixture as the holidays themselves. Only three decades removed from the end of the American War, the patriotic people of Vietnam still feel very much indebted to the Party for their independence. As one party cadre with more than 50 years of service eloquently puts it: “Without the Party we would never have gotten to this point.” However, as time elapses and memories of war diminish, this form of legitimacy will gradually ebb.
After reunification in 1975, the now Communist Party of Vietnam immediately claimed sole possession of control over post-war reconstruction and development. Despite the failure to implement a functional socialist-oriented economy, the party still claims Marxist-Leninist ideology to be its core principle. In reality, much of this rhetorics is now used to legitimize the role of the Party as the guiding light of the nation. The two popular slogans “Dan Biet, Dan Ban, Dan Lam, Dan Kiem Tra” and “Dang Vien Di Truoc, Lang Nuoc Theo Sau” demonstrate the Party's attempt at establishing its power as a matter of fact. As long as Marxist-Leninist ideology remains the figurehead core principle, the Party, as the sole historical protector and interpreter of this ideology, can stake claim as the omniscient, all-knowing voice of the land. The people thus only need to know, follow and execute the parties' policies without the need to question their validity. The Party, however, will find it increasingly difficult to justify its Marxist-Leninist orientation in the face of contradicting and liberal economic policies.
The last and perhaps most important form of legitimacy is economic performance. Tremendous growth since Doi Moi has significantly increased the standing of the Party. People have been more willing to overlook shortcomings of the one-party regime as long as the economy is doing well. However, this is a two-bladed knife, as poor economic performance can also significantly hurt the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes. There is a strong correlation between the global economic crises of the 1970's/1980's and the subsequent democratization of no less than 30 third-world countries. This Third Wave of Democratization, as coined by Samuel Huntington, demonstrates that no country is insusceptible to the boom-and-bust cycles of the global economy and any non-democratic regime relying on economic performance to legitimize its power will sooner or later collapse.
Given these reasons, the Party cannot afford to underestimate the issue of legitimacy. It needs to find a system in which its existence is legitimized by the general population in one form or another. This does not necessarily imply the need for a full-fledged multi-party democracy. Electoral reform and open direct election of major positions would be a good first step toward cementing the legitimacy of the system.
On power balancing
Vietnam's size, geographic location and political orientation make it an ideal pawn in the power-balancing schemes of super powers. The only country to have fought four out of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Vietnam has had up-and-down relationships with most of the major powers in the world. The need to delicately play off one super power against each other requires Vietnam to be flexible in its political orientation and might ultimately influence its future direction.
The most pressing international issue on Vietnam's agenda is the relationship with China. The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and recent territorial conflicts underline the millennium-old tension between the two countries. The relationship, while commercially beneficial for both sides, is politically very one-sided. Vietnam has been largely unresponsive to China's takeover of Paracel and Spratly Islands, and it is hard to say that its decision to allow a Chinese mining SOE to proceed with bauxite mining in the Central Highlands was free of political pressure from the northern neighbor.
The second issue involves international pressure on Vietnam to democratize and promote human rights. Economic liberalization and integration have brought Vietnam much closer to the West. However, as access to major international organizations like WTO, World Bank, IMF often requires approvals from major Western powers, the Party is finding it difficult to avoid these sensitive issues. Because Vietnam has not made any concrete concession, democracy and human rights will undoubtedly continue to be a fixture on every negotiation table involving Vietnam and the West, especially considering the government's recent crackdown on dissidents.
The third major international partner of Vietnam is ASEAN. Founded by Phillipines, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in 1967, ASEAN has grown to include all countries in South East Asia except for East Timor. ASEAN is a major attraction for Vietnam for three reasons. First of all, it provides export markets and other economic incentives. Second of all, since most ASEAN governments are non-democratic, ASEAN provides a buffer against outside pressure on human rights and democratization. Last but not least, ASEAN's policy of non-interference ensures that Vietnam is not constrained in its handling of domestic policies. The recently ratified ASEAN Charter is widely seen as the first move toward an institutionalized regional association similar to the EU capable of negotiating on behalf of all of its members. The success of this endeavor will give Vietnam a true alliance in the international system.
Any conjecture regarding Vietnam's political future needs to take into consideration the fact that as a small and weak nation, Vietnam cannot avoid having its internal affairs influenced by super powers. Just as it took full advantages of the Sino-Soviet split, the Party will have to walk a very fine line in handling international affairs. It is hard to expect its internal composition to remain unchanged if the Party wants to continue partnering up with the West for economic development. It is equally hard to expect China to embrace a fully, or even a partially democratized Vietnam. In times to come, Vietnam might find ASEAN to be a blessing. If it grows to the regional status of the EU, ASEAN can provide a giant shield against both China and the US, allowing Vietnam to open up politically at an appropriate pace.
On political dissent
The rising number of political dissidents within Vietnam will undoubtedly have an impact on Vietnam's political future. While no event on the scale of Tienanmen Square has taken place, the government is not oblivious to the threat that political opposition poses both to the rule of the Party and the stability of the nation. There are at least 15 opposition parties in Vietnam and while considered illegal and denounced as terrorist organizations by the states, these groups continue to operate, some even publicly. Since 2006, some of these groups have coalesced into a more united and visible movement, the so-called Bloc 8406, named after the date on which their founding manifesto was signed. Bloc 8406 is composed mainly of urban professionals and religious figures, ranging from priests and Buddhists to university professors and lawyers. Its “Freedom and Democracy for Vietnam” manifesto condemns the rule of the Communist party and advocates the immediate transformation to democracy. Bloc 8406 typifies the flaws of the pro-democracy movement in Vietnam. These opposition parties suffer from lacks of long-term visions, effective organization, and most importantly a clear understanding of contemporary Vietnamese politics.
First, the central goal of establishing of a full-fledged Western multi-party democracy is flawed and unreasonable to the point of absurdity. Similar to how Phan Boi Chau courted Japan and Phan Chu Trinh flirted with French ideology, the movement fails to take into consideration the culture and political nature of its own motherland. As a heavily Confucian country that has never experienced democratic rule for 3000 years, to expect a Western style democracy to be fully functional and the people to embrace it overnight is entirely unrealistic. Just as Japan and South Korea have their own flavors of democracy, any opposition movement must seriously take Vietnamese political culture into consideration so that a democratic regime does not clash with cultural values and virtues of Vietnam.
Second, the movement continues to look to foreign politicians and overseas Vietnamese for guidance. A separate Bloc 8406 appeal brandished the signatures of 50 American senators and other Vietnamese Americans, many of whom still fly the old flag of the South Vietnamese regime. It appears that the movement is trying to lend itself more credibility in all places except for Vietnam. It is abundantly clear from the Vietnam War that the Vietnamese despise two classes of people more than anyone else: those foreigners who seek to interfere in Vietnamese domestic affairs, and those Vietnamese lackeys who provide them assistance. It is not hard to see why the government has been able to portray these opposition parties as terrorist organizations and successfully link the pro-democracy movement to the what remains of the anti-independence movement. Any pro-democracy movement that wishes to succeed must decouple itself from any external guidance, especially from organizations associated with the former South Vietnamese regime. Only Vietnamese can settle Vietnam's future.
The third problem with the pro-democracy movement is the lack of substance and direction. One of the biggest reasons the Communist Party emerged victorious from the Vietnam War is its dedication to party building. The Party established a strict hierarchy that infiltrated very single corner of society. Small cells of cadres were installed in every village, on top of which further layers of the hierarchy were built. The party had control, support, and surveillance on all different demographics: rural, urban, young, old, etc... It routinely educated and recruited non-party members. The same can hardly be said about the opposition movement. Besides handing out generic calls for democracy, it achieves little else. It almost seems like advocating for democracy has become more of a fashionable act than a movement that requires dedication and sustainability. A glaring example is the Bloc 8406 manifesto itself, which, besides declaring that “the present political regime in Vietnam [must be] changed in a fundamental way, not through incremental “renovation” steps or, even worse, through insignificant touch-ups here and there,” offer little to no blueprint as to how such goal could be accomplished. The core group of urban intellectuals and religious figures is completely disconnected from the rural farmer population that comprises the majority of Vietnamese. This was essentially why the early independence movement failed until Ho Chi Minh was able to establish an United Front of all classes and demographics. Any major revolution would require popular peasants support, as South Vietnam, and even North Vietnam during the Tet Offensive of 1968, learned the hard way. The inability to reach out and create a widespread network of support will spell defeat for the movement.
The fourth problem with the movement is the lack of a competent leading apparatus. Many parties are spearheaded by former South Vietnamese officials which hurt more then help their prospects. Current Vietnamese leaders of the movement lack the knowledge, sensibility and understanding of domestic and international political environment necessary to stage a proper revolution. To give one concrete example, Mr. Nguyen Tien Trung, the founder of the “Youth for Democracy” movement, maintains a blog in which he lists his real name, address and information about his military service that allows the authority to pin point his exact location without breaking a sweat. He has been arrested. Just like the independence movement in which it was crucial that key figures like Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh avoided arrests, the success of the pro-democracy movement relies heavily on the discipline of its leaders. Public revealing the identity of signees might have brought Bloc 8406 a modicum of credibility, but that effectively ended its operation as most of them were arrested, harassed and watched 24/7. Even when outright stupidities are not committed, carelessness can still spell the end of activists, as in the case of Lawyer Le Cong Dinh.
On Future Reform
Even a one-party regime can implement more democratic practices without adopting democracy. Liberalizing government institutions is the easiest way to do that. Undertaken in recent years, the government will need to further implement the concepts of separation of power. Compared to years past where floor debates focus on how to properly phrase certain sentences of the law, the National Assembly today is a much improvement, but its role is still minuscule compared to the enumerated powers in the Constitution. It still exists largely as the legislative arm of the Politburo, and this is unlikely to change in the future but public debates regarding key issues like bauxite mining are engaging public interest and might help to augment the role of the National Assembly. While there is not much separation of power to be had in a one party system, there can be measures to ensure the Party holds itself accountable for its policies. Questioning sessions of Ministers are a first step toward implementing more substantial checks-and-balances. The most plaguing issue, however, is the role of the judicial branch. The Supreme Court of Vietnam functions legally under the authority of the National Assembly and thus it rarely if ever rules against the Party. While Vietnam has taken legal reforms in recent years with the help of the United States, the judicial branch's largely non-existent role in daily life has undermined the power of the law.
Democracy doesn't happen overnight nor is it the magical pill that solves all ills. It is the ultimate manifestation of voluntary political openness; it cannot be forced upon those who are not ready for it. It is not an end but rather a mean of achieving a better, more civil society. It has flaws and limitations, ones that must be acknowledged and overcome. Vietnam will still face the very same problems with democracy as it is facing with communism. Officials will still be as corrupted deep down as they are today. Poverty will still be there; so will Agent Orange victims. Cities will continue to grow at the expense of rural areas. Industrialization will continue to shred the thin fabrics of morality and family ties. It's important to keep these distinctions in mind when considering democracy for Vietnam. What democracy can potential help is a better system of dealing with those problems. Not all features of democracy will apply to Vietnam; some will even hurt. Those promoting a more open political system will need to look beyond the black box that is labeled democracy and only pick out what will benefit this country. More importantly, just because a system is not working does not mean every part of it is non-functional. Socialism, despite all its flaws and shortcomings, did not become popular in Vietnam for no reason. Fundamental commitments to eradicate poverty, to maintain social-economic equality, to provide universal health-care and to main cultural virtues and values are not unique to the modern Vietnam. Both the leaders of the Communist Party and the pro-democracy movement must keep these domestic and international circumstances in mind so they can chart a middle ground that will ensure that Vietnamese politics can develop openly, stably and responsibly.
Tuesday, September 1, 2009
A Humble Introduction
Choosing a title is often the easiest part of writing a blog, but for this author, it was an almost insurmountable challenge. This difficulty cannot entirely be blamed on a lack of creativity from the author's part. Vietnamese politics is still as polarizing a subject now as it was three decades ago. The middle ground is extremely narrow, and those adventurous enough to traverse this road has a very small margin of errors. As such, most publications, newspapers, websites and people tend to gravitate toward one extreme or another. Their political orientations depend more on geographical location and upbringing and less on educated and well-informed opinions. The author, having been fortunate enough to travel the globe, wants to avoid such pitfalls and strive for neutrality. After cycling through a horde of names, from Fraternite-Liberte-Egalite, to OSS Agent 19*, all of which can cause the blog to be misconstrued as a defense of either extreme, the author decided to borrow the current title from one of his favorite blogs: Observing Japan, written by Tobias Harris. The simple title helps set the tone for the rest of the blog. Each subsequent post will strive to provide the most detailed, responsible and objective view of current events, in order to contribute to political discourse and greater goods of Vietnam and Asia.
* Code-name given by CIA to Ho Chi Minh, who participated in several of its Indochina-based intelligence missions during WW2
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