On Crisis Management in Southeast Asia

While men are busy killing each other via roadside bombs and genocide, nature is quietly carrying out the same task, albeit in a far more frequent and deadly manner. The series of natural disasters that hit Southeast Asia in late September, which included two super-typhoons and two mega-earthquakes, reaffirms this chilling fact. Over a thousand people were killed and billions of dollars were lost in property damages. While these disasters will undoubtedly hurt the economy in the immediate future, the long-term effects are less apparent. The link between disaster unpreparedness and political structure suggests that these disasters would necessitate very little, if any, major political, economic or social changes in these countries.

Experience is a great teacher

The United Nations estimates that in 2008 alone the world lost 236,000 lives and $186 billion dollars in over 300 natural disasters. Statistics shows that 60% of the world’s natural disasters occurred in Southeast Asia (Source: Canadian TV), while Asia accounted for 90% of human displacement (Source: UN) due to these events. One of the deadliest disasters in history took place just 5 years ago in this region, when a 9.3 undersea earthquake unleashed a tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of people in one stroke. With the memory of such devastating events fresh in minds, one would expect disaster-prone countries to be more prepared for future disasters. In a sense, this is true. International as well as local groups have consistently improved their disaster-response teams in the region (Source: Wall Street). For example, Red Cross has rebuilt 5,500 earthquake-resistant homes in Indonesia since the disaster and trained 1,200 volunteers in disasters relief (Source: Canadian TV). However, most of these improvements are post-facto relief measures while the most pressing needs, prevention efforts and early detections, are woefully ignored.

So why haven’t they learned?

This problem on the surface can be easily blamed on technological inadequacy and underdeveloped infrastructure. Weather bureau officials of the Philippines admitted that they had a very small number of radar stations to track, on average, the twenty typhoons that approach the country annually (Source: alertnet.org). Primitive, outdated and aging infrastructures in these developing countries are exposed in the face of natural disasters, causing news to reach remote areas more slowly and evacuation efforts to be stalled. Thailand’s recent tsunami evacuation drill failed spectacularly because the alerts from the 79 warning towers did not reach all villagers (Source: foxnews.com). However, this is not entirely responsible for the fact that Southeast Asia is seemingly unprepared every time a disaster hits. Most major disasters can be and are forecasted well in advanced so while the lack of physical infrastructure is a limiting factor, the root of this problem is the underlying political structures of these countries.

Whose fault is it really?

Addressing the lack of early actions requires political changes. The real problem lies in bureaucratic incompetence, lacks of accountability and insufficient commitment to environmental problems. The first two issues can be easily seen in Vietnam’s typhoon forecast debacle. A party leader in Quang Ngai province, one of the areas hit hardest by Typhoon Ketsana, blamed his province’s unpreparedness on inaccurate forecasts by the National Center for Hydrometerological Forecasting. The Center demurred, saying that notices released by the national center as well as the local center all included Quang Ngai as a potential region. Regardless of the truth, Quang Ngai leaders were at fault for their failure to prepare for the worst-case scenario, and their subsequent failure to evacuate the villagers in a timely manner. Chief of the Quang Ngai’s Steering Board for Flood and Storm Control Truong Ngoc Nhi later said: “It is unnecessary to find who is wrong and who is right but it is more important to deal with losses and stabilize the lives of the local residents.” (Source: Vietnam News). This highlights the buck passing practice all too common in the Vietnamese government: officials deflect the blame and downplay the need for accountability when the blame falls on them. Without accountability, incompetence cannot be corrected. Without competent officials, more people will die.

The most depressing fact, however, is a lack of genuine commitment to disaster prevention. In 2004, the military junta of Myanmar actually blocked foreign aid to disasters of Cyclone Nargis. While governments of other Southeast Asian countries have never gone to such extreme, very little money has been dedicated to improving disaster detection systems. The government of the Philippines came under criticism for spending billions of pesos on questionable activities (foreign visits by officials, presidential dinners abroad, campaign contribution, etc…) and yet only two rubber boats could immediately be provided to rescue victims in Marikina, which is flooded every year by the Marikina River. The same applies to Central Vietnam, which faces floods and typhoons nine months out of the year. Even more frightening is that Phuket, a popular tourist destination in Thailand, is dependent on a buoy running on backup battery power for warnings of incoming tsunamis (Source: foxnews.com).

Will they ever learn?

On the surface, these disasters provide ample support for changes. But as mentioned, these are not easy technological changes, but difficult political changes, namely improved performance, accountability and different political agendas that might directly conflict with the authoritarian nature of these governments. Are Southeast Asian governments willing to make tough changes to save precious human lives? As of now, the answer seems to be an astounding no. While the most recent disasters are very destructive, they are relatively minor in comparison to the history of natural disasters in Southeast Asia, both in terms of human tolls and property damages. The 2004 tsunami killed almost 200,000 in Southeast Asia and cost billions of dollars. The regions affected by recent earthquakes in Indonesia, on the other hand, only account for 3% of its annual GDP. The Philippines’s agricultural structure was spared, while the rest of the affected businesses could still operate as long as the phone lines are functional. In fact, some economies might even benefit from these disasters in the long run because blossoming construction sectors generally have an accelerating effect on GDP, evident in Taiwan’s improved economy thanks to rebuilding areas hit by Typhoon Morakot. (Source: Barclay and Bloomberg). These disasters will compel Southeast Asian leaders to at least consider accelerating the process of economic integration and environmental cooperation, and to devote more resources of handling future natural disasters. However, Southeast Asia has witnessed plenty of similar disasters before and therefore it is unlikely that these governments will undertake any dramatic and fundamental changes to their internal political and economic structures.

Lessons of the War

Born and raised under the care of a Confucian scholar, Ho Chi Minh harbored nationalistic feelings long before he turned to Communism. Expelled from school for demonstrating against the French colonial administration, Ho Chi Minh left Vietnam for France, working as kitchen helper on the Amiral Latouche-Tréville. His true motive for leaving Vietnam was unknown, though Vietnamese textbooks touted that their spiritual father set out to free Vietnam from French rule. During his years in France, Ho Chi Minh undertook various menial jobs while educating himself in Western political theories. After World War I, Ho Chi Minh petitioned President Woodrow Wilson for the colonies' rights of self-determination. Wilson's 14-point plan fell through in the US Senate and Ho Chi Minh's petition subsequently fell to deaf ears. This was when Ho Chi Minh gravitated to Communism. He went on to become a founding member of the French Communist Party and Intercolonial Union. He also founded the Revolutionary Youth League, a precursor of the Indochinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam in the 1940's to lead the national resistance against the Japanese, French and American. His power and health dwindled in the 1960's but he remains the nation's most sacred figure and spritual father until today.

Little is known about this shadowy and complex figure. While Ho Chi Minh has been labeled by many as a communist, an agitator and a puppet, historians generally agree that he was first and foremost a patriot  motivated by independence for his homeland. A pragmatist constrained by constant internal bickering, external meddling as well as the inherent difficulty of institutionalizing communism, Ho Chi Minh has largely failed to achieve his true vision of Vietnam. Lost in the bloodshed and brutality of the war was his ideology, the bastard child of Vietnamese's Neo-Confucianism and Western liberalism. Ho Chi Minh chose a wise course for a small and feeble nation like Vietnam, not only in war but also in peace. He was not a pioneer, but rather a skillful diplomat who understood a few important points about Vietnam's history, values and place in the world.

First, the millenia-old struggles for independence showed the importance of popular support. Demonstrated both in popular uprisings, those of Quang Trung, the Trung Sisters, and the Tay Son brothers, as well as Confucian values and folklores, people only rise up to support those rulers worthy of respect and sympathetic to their cause. Weapons and technology cannot outlast the will of millions of people. The Vietminh's rise from a pathetic guerrilla force to a modern conventional army could not be completed without the backing of millions of Vietnamese peasants. When they weren't sacrificing lives, they provided food, shelter and morale boost to those who were. Later in the war, these same peasants traversed thousands of miles along the Ho Chi Minh trail to resupply Southern comrades. These voluntary sacrifices are almost unprecedented in world history and they stem not from nationalism, for there were non-Communist nationalist forces in Vietnam, but rather from the public trust earned by the Vietminh after years of supporting peasants' causes. The moral of the lesson is, in war or peace, national success and popular support go hand in hand.

Secondly, the unfortunate status of Vietnam as a small and weak country, both militarily and economically, necessarily dictates that it be wise in foreign policies. There is not a better illustration of this than the Vietnam War. Having simultaneously fought and befriended four out of five members on the UN permanent security council, Vietnam has had its fair shares of conflicts and broken alliances. This is what Vietnam must always face. China, Russia and US will continue their tugs of war all over the world, of which Vietnam plays a key role given its geo-political position, capitalistic leaning, and penchant for Western lifestyle. Considering this, Vietnam will constantly be placed in a position of change and must be ready to modify its foreign policy stand, as it did with China, Russia and the US in the post-war period.

These two points, among others, are crucial to understand the political development of Vietnam. How will the government garner public support without allowing for a free general election? How will engaging the West affect Vietnam's relationship with China as well as its domestic political composition?