On legitimacy
The first and foremost obstacle the Party faces is the problem of legitimacy. Legitimacy is the popular acceptance of a government as the legal political authority. Each regime type has a different idea of what constitutes legitimacy. For example, in constitutional monarchies, the general population accept the concept of hereditary rule and mandate of heaven as a matter of fact while in democratic countries, the ruled legitimizes the rulers through an electoral process. Lying somewhere between these two extremes, the Communist Party has traditionally employed a mix of strategies to legitimize its hold of power: Nationalism, Idealism and Eudaemonism.
Emerging from the victory over France in Dien Bien Phu as the primary agent of freedom, the Workers Party's leadership in the struggle for independence has largely sustained its legitimacy until this day. Some of the most celebrated holidays in Vietnam date back to the colonial period: Independence Day (September 2nd), Reunification Day (April 30th), Hanoi Liberation Day (October 10th). The Party takes full advantages of these historical hallmarks by reinforcing memories of its role in defeating the French and the American. Documentaries praising the bravery, ingenuity and sacrifices of party cadres are as permanent a fixture as the holidays themselves. Only three decades removed from the end of the American War, the patriotic people of Vietnam still feel very much indebted to the Party for their independence. As one party cadre with more than 50 years of service eloquently puts it: “Without the Party we would never have gotten to this point.” However, as time elapses and memories of war diminish, this form of legitimacy will gradually ebb.
After reunification in 1975, the now Communist Party of Vietnam immediately claimed sole possession of control over post-war reconstruction and development. Despite the failure to implement a functional socialist-oriented economy, the party still claims Marxist-Leninist ideology to be its core principle. In reality, much of this rhetorics is now used to legitimize the role of the Party as the guiding light of the nation. The two popular slogans “Dan Biet, Dan Ban, Dan Lam, Dan Kiem Tra” and “Dang Vien Di Truoc, Lang Nuoc Theo Sau” demonstrate the Party's attempt at establishing its power as a matter of fact. As long as Marxist-Leninist ideology remains the figurehead core principle, the Party, as the sole historical protector and interpreter of this ideology, can stake claim as the omniscient, all-knowing voice of the land. The people thus only need to know, follow and execute the parties' policies without the need to question their validity. The Party, however, will find it increasingly difficult to justify its Marxist-Leninist orientation in the face of contradicting and liberal economic policies.
The last and perhaps most important form of legitimacy is economic performance. Tremendous growth since Doi Moi has significantly increased the standing of the Party. People have been more willing to overlook shortcomings of the one-party regime as long as the economy is doing well. However, this is a two-bladed knife, as poor economic performance can also significantly hurt the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes. There is a strong correlation between the global economic crises of the 1970's/1980's and the subsequent democratization of no less than 30 third-world countries. This Third Wave of Democratization, as coined by Samuel Huntington, demonstrates that no country is insusceptible to the boom-and-bust cycles of the global economy and any non-democratic regime relying on economic performance to legitimize its power will sooner or later collapse.
Given these reasons, the Party cannot afford to underestimate the issue of legitimacy. It needs to find a system in which its existence is legitimized by the general population in one form or another. This does not necessarily imply the need for a full-fledged multi-party democracy. Electoral reform and open direct election of major positions would be a good first step toward cementing the legitimacy of the system.
On power balancing
Vietnam's size, geographic location and political orientation make it an ideal pawn in the power-balancing schemes of super powers. The only country to have fought four out of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Vietnam has had up-and-down relationships with most of the major powers in the world. The need to delicately play off one super power against each other requires Vietnam to be flexible in its political orientation and might ultimately influence its future direction.
The most pressing international issue on Vietnam's agenda is the relationship with China. The Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 and recent territorial conflicts underline the millennium-old tension between the two countries. The relationship, while commercially beneficial for both sides, is politically very one-sided. Vietnam has been largely unresponsive to China's takeover of Paracel and Spratly Islands, and it is hard to say that its decision to allow a Chinese mining SOE to proceed with bauxite mining in the Central Highlands was free of political pressure from the northern neighbor.
The second issue involves international pressure on Vietnam to democratize and promote human rights. Economic liberalization and integration have brought Vietnam much closer to the West. However, as access to major international organizations like WTO, World Bank, IMF often requires approvals from major Western powers, the Party is finding it difficult to avoid these sensitive issues. Because Vietnam has not made any concrete concession, democracy and human rights will undoubtedly continue to be a fixture on every negotiation table involving Vietnam and the West, especially considering the government's recent crackdown on dissidents.
The third major international partner of Vietnam is ASEAN. Founded by Phillipines, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in 1967, ASEAN has grown to include all countries in South East Asia except for East Timor. ASEAN is a major attraction for Vietnam for three reasons. First of all, it provides export markets and other economic incentives. Second of all, since most ASEAN governments are non-democratic, ASEAN provides a buffer against outside pressure on human rights and democratization. Last but not least, ASEAN's policy of non-interference ensures that Vietnam is not constrained in its handling of domestic policies. The recently ratified ASEAN Charter is widely seen as the first move toward an institutionalized regional association similar to the EU capable of negotiating on behalf of all of its members. The success of this endeavor will give Vietnam a true alliance in the international system.
Any conjecture regarding Vietnam's political future needs to take into consideration the fact that as a small and weak nation, Vietnam cannot avoid having its internal affairs influenced by super powers. Just as it took full advantages of the Sino-Soviet split, the Party will have to walk a very fine line in handling international affairs. It is hard to expect its internal composition to remain unchanged if the Party wants to continue partnering up with the West for economic development. It is equally hard to expect China to embrace a fully, or even a partially democratized Vietnam. In times to come, Vietnam might find ASEAN to be a blessing. If it grows to the regional status of the EU, ASEAN can provide a giant shield against both China and the US, allowing Vietnam to open up politically at an appropriate pace.
On political dissent
The rising number of political dissidents within Vietnam will undoubtedly have an impact on Vietnam's political future. While no event on the scale of Tienanmen Square has taken place, the government is not oblivious to the threat that political opposition poses both to the rule of the Party and the stability of the nation. There are at least 15 opposition parties in Vietnam and while considered illegal and denounced as terrorist organizations by the states, these groups continue to operate, some even publicly. Since 2006, some of these groups have coalesced into a more united and visible movement, the so-called Bloc 8406, named after the date on which their founding manifesto was signed. Bloc 8406 is composed mainly of urban professionals and religious figures, ranging from priests and Buddhists to university professors and lawyers. Its “Freedom and Democracy for Vietnam” manifesto condemns the rule of the Communist party and advocates the immediate transformation to democracy. Bloc 8406 typifies the flaws of the pro-democracy movement in Vietnam. These opposition parties suffer from lacks of long-term visions, effective organization, and most importantly a clear understanding of contemporary Vietnamese politics.
First, the central goal of establishing of a full-fledged Western multi-party democracy is flawed and unreasonable to the point of absurdity. Similar to how Phan Boi Chau courted Japan and Phan Chu Trinh flirted with French ideology, the movement fails to take into consideration the culture and political nature of its own motherland. As a heavily Confucian country that has never experienced democratic rule for 3000 years, to expect a Western style democracy to be fully functional and the people to embrace it overnight is entirely unrealistic. Just as Japan and South Korea have their own flavors of democracy, any opposition movement must seriously take Vietnamese political culture into consideration so that a democratic regime does not clash with cultural values and virtues of Vietnam.
Second, the movement continues to look to foreign politicians and overseas Vietnamese for guidance. A separate Bloc 8406 appeal brandished the signatures of 50 American senators and other Vietnamese Americans, many of whom still fly the old flag of the South Vietnamese regime. It appears that the movement is trying to lend itself more credibility in all places except for Vietnam. It is abundantly clear from the Vietnam War that the Vietnamese despise two classes of people more than anyone else: those foreigners who seek to interfere in Vietnamese domestic affairs, and those Vietnamese lackeys who provide them assistance. It is not hard to see why the government has been able to portray these opposition parties as terrorist organizations and successfully link the pro-democracy movement to the what remains of the anti-independence movement. Any pro-democracy movement that wishes to succeed must decouple itself from any external guidance, especially from organizations associated with the former South Vietnamese regime. Only Vietnamese can settle Vietnam's future.
The third problem with the pro-democracy movement is the lack of substance and direction. One of the biggest reasons the Communist Party emerged victorious from the Vietnam War is its dedication to party building. The Party established a strict hierarchy that infiltrated very single corner of society. Small cells of cadres were installed in every village, on top of which further layers of the hierarchy were built. The party had control, support, and surveillance on all different demographics: rural, urban, young, old, etc... It routinely educated and recruited non-party members. The same can hardly be said about the opposition movement. Besides handing out generic calls for democracy, it achieves little else. It almost seems like advocating for democracy has become more of a fashionable act than a movement that requires dedication and sustainability. A glaring example is the Bloc 8406 manifesto itself, which, besides declaring that “the present political regime in Vietnam [must be] changed in a fundamental way, not through incremental “renovation” steps or, even worse, through insignificant touch-ups here and there,” offer little to no blueprint as to how such goal could be accomplished. The core group of urban intellectuals and religious figures is completely disconnected from the rural farmer population that comprises the majority of Vietnamese. This was essentially why the early independence movement failed until Ho Chi Minh was able to establish an United Front of all classes and demographics. Any major revolution would require popular peasants support, as South Vietnam, and even North Vietnam during the Tet Offensive of 1968, learned the hard way. The inability to reach out and create a widespread network of support will spell defeat for the movement.
The fourth problem with the movement is the lack of a competent leading apparatus. Many parties are spearheaded by former South Vietnamese officials which hurt more then help their prospects. Current Vietnamese leaders of the movement lack the knowledge, sensibility and understanding of domestic and international political environment necessary to stage a proper revolution. To give one concrete example, Mr. Nguyen Tien Trung, the founder of the “Youth for Democracy” movement, maintains a blog in which he lists his real name, address and information about his military service that allows the authority to pin point his exact location without breaking a sweat. He has been arrested. Just like the independence movement in which it was crucial that key figures like Vo Nguyen Giap and Ho Chi Minh avoided arrests, the success of the pro-democracy movement relies heavily on the discipline of its leaders. Public revealing the identity of signees might have brought Bloc 8406 a modicum of credibility, but that effectively ended its operation as most of them were arrested, harassed and watched 24/7. Even when outright stupidities are not committed, carelessness can still spell the end of activists, as in the case of Lawyer Le Cong Dinh.
On Future Reform
Even a one-party regime can implement more democratic practices without adopting democracy. Liberalizing government institutions is the easiest way to do that. Undertaken in recent years, the government will need to further implement the concepts of separation of power. Compared to years past where floor debates focus on how to properly phrase certain sentences of the law, the National Assembly today is a much improvement, but its role is still minuscule compared to the enumerated powers in the Constitution. It still exists largely as the legislative arm of the Politburo, and this is unlikely to change in the future but public debates regarding key issues like bauxite mining are engaging public interest and might help to augment the role of the National Assembly. While there is not much separation of power to be had in a one party system, there can be measures to ensure the Party holds itself accountable for its policies. Questioning sessions of Ministers are a first step toward implementing more substantial checks-and-balances. The most plaguing issue, however, is the role of the judicial branch. The Supreme Court of Vietnam functions legally under the authority of the National Assembly and thus it rarely if ever rules against the Party. While Vietnam has taken legal reforms in recent years with the help of the United States, the judicial branch's largely non-existent role in daily life has undermined the power of the law.
Democracy doesn't happen overnight nor is it the magical pill that solves all ills. It is the ultimate manifestation of voluntary political openness; it cannot be forced upon those who are not ready for it. It is not an end but rather a mean of achieving a better, more civil society. It has flaws and limitations, ones that must be acknowledged and overcome. Vietnam will still face the very same problems with democracy as it is facing with communism. Officials will still be as corrupted deep down as they are today. Poverty will still be there; so will Agent Orange victims. Cities will continue to grow at the expense of rural areas. Industrialization will continue to shred the thin fabrics of morality and family ties. It's important to keep these distinctions in mind when considering democracy for Vietnam. What democracy can potential help is a better system of dealing with those problems. Not all features of democracy will apply to Vietnam; some will even hurt. Those promoting a more open political system will need to look beyond the black box that is labeled democracy and only pick out what will benefit this country. More importantly, just because a system is not working does not mean every part of it is non-functional. Socialism, despite all its flaws and shortcomings, did not become popular in Vietnam for no reason. Fundamental commitments to eradicate poverty, to maintain social-economic equality, to provide universal health-care and to main cultural virtues and values are not unique to the modern Vietnam. Both the leaders of the Communist Party and the pro-democracy movement must keep these domestic and international circumstances in mind so they can chart a middle ground that will ensure that Vietnamese politics can develop openly, stably and responsibly.
