On Smokes and Mirrors: Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan, which flew under the radar after the quick and successful invasion by U.S. forces in 2001, has reappeared front and center on President Obama’s foreign agenda. The Vietnam-Afghanistan comparison has become a favorite topic of armchair politicians. Parallels between the conflicts certainly exist: the nature of warfare, the corrupt U.S.-backed regimes, and the wars’ unpopularity in the U.S. The question of whether Afghanistan is the new Vietnam, however, is irrelevant. The real challenge for policy makers is to examine the roots of their similarities in order to find a potential solution to the situation in Afghanistan.

Two aspects of the Vietnam conflict are particularly relevant to Afghanistan today: American support for an unpopular regime and irresponsible reconstruction spending. A motivation for U.S. intervention in Vietnam was the desire to bolster America’s reputation as a champion of freedom and friend to democracy, yet the U.S. ended up sponsoring one of the most corrupt and authoritarian regimes in recent history. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem declared himself President of Vietnam after winning 600,000 out of 400,000 possible votes. He later won uncontested re-election after two candidates refused American bribes to stand in and create the appearance of legitimacy. Diem was eventually assassinated in a coup tacitly approved by the U.S. In sponsoring an authoritarian regime and later providing implicit support for a coup d’etat against it, the U.S. undermined the viability of subsequent governments and undercut the legitimacy of its intervention in Vietnam.

Another U.S. goal, pacifying Vietnam through economic prosperity, also failed spectacularly. Billions of dollars were poured into Saigon at the expense of rural areas, the very places where American forces needed to win hearts and minds. Traditional businesses were abandoned by Vietnamese civilians in favor of prostitution and drug trafficking. Key industries like agriculture were so woefully ignored by the administration that starting in 1965, South Vietnam actually became a rice importer.

The situation in Afghanistan has similar characteristics. Both Afghanistan and Vietnam were distant, small, and impoverished nations that posed little external threat to the United States. The Karzai administration, like Diem’s, is plagued by corruption, fraudulent elections, and unpopularity. Both administrations depended heavily on American aid, but openly defied American recommendations in order to avoid being branded puppet regimes. American airstrikes have killed many civilians in Afghanistan, in much the same way that Agent Orange devastated South Vietnam. Finally, like in Vietnam, narcotics production is a major industry in Afghanistan. After the 2001 invasion, Afghanistan quickly regained its status as the world’s largest opium producer.

The main distinction between Vietnam and Afghanistan, one that is a blessing for the U.S., is the nature of the resistance. Ho Chi Minh was a charismatic figure fighting for national independence, a cause even his enemies found difficult to criticize. Had Diem not blocked the 1956 election out of fear of losing, Ho would have won by a landslide. The Taliban, however, do not enjoy similar support. Their tyrannical rule was widely unpopular, and their cruel treatment of women, bombing of public facilities, and use of schools as military barracks angered both ordinary Afghans and other extremist factions.

The Obama administration can capitalize on the Taliban’s weakness and win the support of the Afghan people by delivering on nation-building promises. Economic and political failures are the main reasons that natives have turned to the Taliban. Afghanistan does not lack natural resources, foreign aid, or manpower. What it lacks is a competent government capable of using those resources. The U.S. should make a firm and credible threat to withdraw help in all forms if the Karzai administration continues to underperform.
Critics may argue such a strategy will strengthen the Taliban, but history has shown that there is much more to be lost if the U.S. continues to be soft on the Afghan government. The Karzai administration, like that of Diem, could become completely dependent on the U.S., and yet remain unwilling to implement its advice. This would gradually give the Taliban even more momentum than they would gain from the U.S. cutting out Karzai today.

Just as the Vietnamese frowned upon Kennedy’s “relief workers” program, Afghans will not trust nation-building efforts if every American is armed with an M16. In order to foster legitimacy for nation-building, the U.S. needs to focus on training Afghan forces to defend themselves. When Afghan forces are able to stabilize regions without significant American support, they will earn popular legitimacy and improve morale, both important developments for their long-term struggle with the Taliban. Training a primitive army like that of Afghanistan will be difficult, but this task is made easier by the Taliban’s unpopularity and the lessons the U.S. learned training the South Vietnamese security force. U.S. personnel must demonstrate respect, compassion, and a willingness to learn and understand the Afghan culture in order to succeed in their efforts.

In hindsight, American foreign policies in Vietnam were incoherent and lacked a well thought-out strategy. The U.S. limped into Vietnam hoping for a quick victory, but as soon as that proved impossible, its entire agenda collapsed. Where the U.S. had clear goals, like winning hearts and minds, shoddy execution and an ignorance of local culture derailed them. The U.S. was fighting with scare tactics and hypocritical policies, which were exposed by a tough-minded and risk-tolerant opposition. For years, policy makers scrambled for quick fixes and honorable exits. President Obama must avoid these pitfalls by crafting a feasible long-term strategy in Afghanistan.

Deploying more troops seems unsustainable. The U.S. will have to fight a war of attrition with the American public as its own worst enemy. The North Vietnamese were willing to risk an inordinate amount of casualties in order to achieve their objective, and the Taliban’s suicide bombings show that they are capable of the same. In contrast, Americans’ casualty aversion is simply too great for the U.S. military to play the same kind of game.

Deploying additional troops, even for security purposes, will merely lead to a vicious cycle of resistance and reinforcement. Consider that in order to protect ground troops, the U.S. relies heavily on air strikes from high altitude that inevitably affect civilians. Rising civilian hostility coupled with failed nation-building efforts strengthen the Taliban and embolden them to stage attacks against American installations, which then precipitate further troop increases and perpetuate the cycle.

President Obama inherited a mess in Afghanistan but also an opportunity to right the course. He should reject the temptation to deploy more troops and instead focus on rebuilding the economic and political infrastructure of Afghanistan. Building a free and prosperous Afghanistan will undermine the reason for the Taliban’s existence and hopefully conclude the conflict with minimal loss of life.