The war in Afghanistan, which flew under the radar after the quick and successful invasion by U.S. forces in 2001, has reappeared front and center on President Obama’s foreign agenda. The Vietnam-Afghanistan comparison has become a favorite topic of armchair politicians. Parallels between the conflicts certainly exist: the nature of warfare, the corrupt U.S.-backed regimes, and the wars’ unpopularity in the U.S. The question of whether Afghanistan is the new Vietnam, however, is irrelevant. The real challenge for policy makers is to examine the roots of their similarities in order to find a potential solution to the situation in Afghanistan.
Two aspects of the Vietnam conflict are particularly relevant to Afghanistan today: American support for an unpopular regime and irresponsible reconstruction spending. A motivation for U.S. intervention in Vietnam was the desire to bolster America’s reputation as a champion of freedom and friend to democracy, yet the U.S. ended up sponsoring one of the most corrupt and authoritarian regimes in recent history. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem declared himself President of Vietnam after winning 600,000 out of 400,000 possible votes. He later won uncontested re-election after two candidates refused American bribes to stand in and create the appearance of legitimacy. Diem was eventually assassinated in a coup tacitly approved by the U.S. In sponsoring an authoritarian regime and later providing implicit support for a coup d’etat against it, the U.S. undermined the viability of subsequent governments and undercut the legitimacy of its intervention in Vietnam.
Another U.S. goal, pacifying Vietnam through economic prosperity, also failed spectacularly. Billions of dollars were poured into Saigon at the expense of rural areas, the very places where American forces needed to win hearts and minds. Traditional businesses were abandoned by Vietnamese civilians in favor of prostitution and drug trafficking. Key industries like agriculture were so woefully ignored by the administration that starting in 1965, South Vietnam actually became a rice importer.
The situation in Afghanistan has similar characteristics. Both Afghanistan and Vietnam were distant, small, and impoverished nations that posed little external threat to the United States. The Karzai administration, like Diem’s, is plagued by corruption, fraudulent elections, and unpopularity. Both administrations depended heavily on American aid, but openly defied American recommendations in order to avoid being branded puppet regimes. American airstrikes have killed many civilians in Afghanistan, in much the same way that Agent Orange devastated South Vietnam. Finally, like in Vietnam, narcotics production is a major industry in Afghanistan. After the 2001 invasion, Afghanistan quickly regained its status as the world’s largest opium producer.
The main distinction between Vietnam and Afghanistan, one that is a blessing for the U.S., is the nature of the resistance. Ho Chi Minh was a charismatic figure fighting for national independence, a cause even his enemies found difficult to criticize. Had Diem not blocked the 1956 election out of fear of losing, Ho would have won by a landslide. The Taliban, however, do not enjoy similar support. Their tyrannical rule was widely unpopular, and their cruel treatment of women, bombing of public facilities, and use of schools as military barracks angered both ordinary Afghans and other extremist factions.
The Obama administration can capitalize on the Taliban’s weakness and win the support of the Afghan people by delivering on nation-building promises. Economic and political failures are the main reasons that natives have turned to the Taliban. Afghanistan does not lack natural resources, foreign aid, or manpower. What it lacks is a competent government capable of using those resources. The U.S. should make a firm and credible threat to withdraw help in all forms if the Karzai administration continues to underperform.
Critics may argue such a strategy will strengthen the Taliban, but history has shown that there is much more to be lost if the U.S. continues to be soft on the Afghan government. The Karzai administration, like that of Diem, could become completely dependent on the U.S., and yet remain unwilling to implement its advice. This would gradually give the Taliban even more momentum than they would gain from the U.S. cutting out Karzai today.
Just as the Vietnamese frowned upon Kennedy’s “relief workers” program, Afghans will not trust nation-building efforts if every American is armed with an M16. In order to foster legitimacy for nation-building, the U.S. needs to focus on training Afghan forces to defend themselves. When Afghan forces are able to stabilize regions without significant American support, they will earn popular legitimacy and improve morale, both important developments for their long-term struggle with the Taliban. Training a primitive army like that of Afghanistan will be difficult, but this task is made easier by the Taliban’s unpopularity and the lessons the U.S. learned training the South Vietnamese security force. U.S. personnel must demonstrate respect, compassion, and a willingness to learn and understand the Afghan culture in order to succeed in their efforts.
In hindsight, American foreign policies in Vietnam were incoherent and lacked a well thought-out strategy. The U.S. limped into Vietnam hoping for a quick victory, but as soon as that proved impossible, its entire agenda collapsed. Where the U.S. had clear goals, like winning hearts and minds, shoddy execution and an ignorance of local culture derailed them. The U.S. was fighting with scare tactics and hypocritical policies, which were exposed by a tough-minded and risk-tolerant opposition. For years, policy makers scrambled for quick fixes and honorable exits. President Obama must avoid these pitfalls by crafting a feasible long-term strategy in Afghanistan.
Deploying more troops seems unsustainable. The U.S. will have to fight a war of attrition with the American public as its own worst enemy. The North Vietnamese were willing to risk an inordinate amount of casualties in order to achieve their objective, and the Taliban’s suicide bombings show that they are capable of the same. In contrast, Americans’ casualty aversion is simply too great for the U.S. military to play the same kind of game.
Deploying additional troops, even for security purposes, will merely lead to a vicious cycle of resistance and reinforcement. Consider that in order to protect ground troops, the U.S. relies heavily on air strikes from high altitude that inevitably affect civilians. Rising civilian hostility coupled with failed nation-building efforts strengthen the Taliban and embolden them to stage attacks against American installations, which then precipitate further troop increases and perpetuate the cycle.
President Obama inherited a mess in Afghanistan but also an opportunity to right the course. He should reject the temptation to deploy more troops and instead focus on rebuilding the economic and political infrastructure of Afghanistan. Building a free and prosperous Afghanistan will undermine the reason for the Taliban’s existence and hopefully conclude the conflict with minimal loss of life.
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
On Crisis Management in Southeast Asia
While men are busy killing each other via roadside bombs and genocide, nature is quietly carrying out the same task, albeit in a far more frequent and deadly manner. The series of natural disasters that hit Southeast Asia in late September, which included two super-typhoons and two mega-earthquakes, reaffirms this chilling fact. Over a thousand people were killed and billions of dollars were lost in property damages. While these disasters will undoubtedly hurt the economy in the immediate future, the long-term effects are less apparent. The link between disaster unpreparedness and political structure suggests that these disasters would necessitate very little, if any, major political, economic or social changes in these countries.
Experience is a great teacher
The United Nations estimates that in 2008 alone the world lost 236,000 lives and $186 billion dollars in over 300 natural disasters. Statistics shows that 60% of the world’s natural disasters occurred in Southeast Asia (Source: Canadian TV), while Asia accounted for 90% of human displacement (Source: UN) due to these events. One of the deadliest disasters in history took place just 5 years ago in this region, when a 9.3 undersea earthquake unleashed a tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of people in one stroke. With the memory of such devastating events fresh in minds, one would expect disaster-prone countries to be more prepared for future disasters. In a sense, this is true. International as well as local groups have consistently improved their disaster-response teams in the region (Source: Wall Street). For example, Red Cross has rebuilt 5,500 earthquake-resistant homes in Indonesia since the disaster and trained 1,200 volunteers in disasters relief (Source: Canadian TV). However, most of these improvements are post-facto relief measures while the most pressing needs, prevention efforts and early detections, are woefully ignored.
So why haven’t they learned?
This problem on the surface can be easily blamed on technological inadequacy and underdeveloped infrastructure. Weather bureau officials of the Philippines admitted that they had a very small number of radar stations to track, on average, the twenty typhoons that approach the country annually (Source: alertnet.org). Primitive, outdated and aging infrastructures in these developing countries are exposed in the face of natural disasters, causing news to reach remote areas more slowly and evacuation efforts to be stalled. Thailand’s recent tsunami evacuation drill failed spectacularly because the alerts from the 79 warning towers did not reach all villagers (Source: foxnews.com). However, this is not entirely responsible for the fact that Southeast Asia is seemingly unprepared every time a disaster hits. Most major disasters can be and are forecasted well in advanced so while the lack of physical infrastructure is a limiting factor, the root of this problem is the underlying political structures of these countries.
Whose fault is it really?
Addressing the lack of early actions requires political changes. The real problem lies in bureaucratic incompetence, lacks of accountability and insufficient commitment to environmental problems. The first two issues can be easily seen in Vietnam’s typhoon forecast debacle. A party leader in Quang Ngai province, one of the areas hit hardest by Typhoon Ketsana, blamed his province’s unpreparedness on inaccurate forecasts by the National Center for Hydrometerological Forecasting. The Center demurred, saying that notices released by the national center as well as the local center all included Quang Ngai as a potential region. Regardless of the truth, Quang Ngai leaders were at fault for their failure to prepare for the worst-case scenario, and their subsequent failure to evacuate the villagers in a timely manner. Chief of the Quang Ngai’s Steering Board for Flood and Storm Control Truong Ngoc Nhi later said: “It is unnecessary to find who is wrong and who is right but it is more important to deal with losses and stabilize the lives of the local residents.” (Source: Vietnam News). This highlights the buck passing practice all too common in the Vietnamese government: officials deflect the blame and downplay the need for accountability when the blame falls on them. Without accountability, incompetence cannot be corrected. Without competent officials, more people will die.
The most depressing fact, however, is a lack of genuine commitment to disaster prevention. In 2004, the military junta of Myanmar actually blocked foreign aid to disasters of Cyclone Nargis. While governments of other Southeast Asian countries have never gone to such extreme, very little money has been dedicated to improving disaster detection systems. The government of the Philippines came under criticism for spending billions of pesos on questionable activities (foreign visits by officials, presidential dinners abroad, campaign contribution, etc…) and yet only two rubber boats could immediately be provided to rescue victims in Marikina, which is flooded every year by the Marikina River. The same applies to Central Vietnam, which faces floods and typhoons nine months out of the year. Even more frightening is that Phuket, a popular tourist destination in Thailand, is dependent on a buoy running on backup battery power for warnings of incoming tsunamis (Source: foxnews.com).
Will they ever learn?
On the surface, these disasters provide ample support for changes. But as mentioned, these are not easy technological changes, but difficult political changes, namely improved performance, accountability and different political agendas that might directly conflict with the authoritarian nature of these governments. Are Southeast Asian governments willing to make tough changes to save precious human lives? As of now, the answer seems to be an astounding no. While the most recent disasters are very destructive, they are relatively minor in comparison to the history of natural disasters in Southeast Asia, both in terms of human tolls and property damages. The 2004 tsunami killed almost 200,000 in Southeast Asia and cost billions of dollars. The regions affected by recent earthquakes in Indonesia, on the other hand, only account for 3% of its annual GDP. The Philippines’s agricultural structure was spared, while the rest of the affected businesses could still operate as long as the phone lines are functional. In fact, some economies might even benefit from these disasters in the long run because blossoming construction sectors generally have an accelerating effect on GDP, evident in Taiwan’s improved economy thanks to rebuilding areas hit by Typhoon Morakot. (Source: Barclay and Bloomberg). These disasters will compel Southeast Asian leaders to at least consider accelerating the process of economic integration and environmental cooperation, and to devote more resources of handling future natural disasters. However, Southeast Asia has witnessed plenty of similar disasters before and therefore it is unlikely that these governments will undertake any dramatic and fundamental changes to their internal political and economic structures.
Experience is a great teacher
The United Nations estimates that in 2008 alone the world lost 236,000 lives and $186 billion dollars in over 300 natural disasters. Statistics shows that 60% of the world’s natural disasters occurred in Southeast Asia (Source: Canadian TV), while Asia accounted for 90% of human displacement (Source: UN) due to these events. One of the deadliest disasters in history took place just 5 years ago in this region, when a 9.3 undersea earthquake unleashed a tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands of people in one stroke. With the memory of such devastating events fresh in minds, one would expect disaster-prone countries to be more prepared for future disasters. In a sense, this is true. International as well as local groups have consistently improved their disaster-response teams in the region (Source: Wall Street). For example, Red Cross has rebuilt 5,500 earthquake-resistant homes in Indonesia since the disaster and trained 1,200 volunteers in disasters relief (Source: Canadian TV). However, most of these improvements are post-facto relief measures while the most pressing needs, prevention efforts and early detections, are woefully ignored.
So why haven’t they learned?
This problem on the surface can be easily blamed on technological inadequacy and underdeveloped infrastructure. Weather bureau officials of the Philippines admitted that they had a very small number of radar stations to track, on average, the twenty typhoons that approach the country annually (Source: alertnet.org). Primitive, outdated and aging infrastructures in these developing countries are exposed in the face of natural disasters, causing news to reach remote areas more slowly and evacuation efforts to be stalled. Thailand’s recent tsunami evacuation drill failed spectacularly because the alerts from the 79 warning towers did not reach all villagers (Source: foxnews.com). However, this is not entirely responsible for the fact that Southeast Asia is seemingly unprepared every time a disaster hits. Most major disasters can be and are forecasted well in advanced so while the lack of physical infrastructure is a limiting factor, the root of this problem is the underlying political structures of these countries.
Whose fault is it really?
Addressing the lack of early actions requires political changes. The real problem lies in bureaucratic incompetence, lacks of accountability and insufficient commitment to environmental problems. The first two issues can be easily seen in Vietnam’s typhoon forecast debacle. A party leader in Quang Ngai province, one of the areas hit hardest by Typhoon Ketsana, blamed his province’s unpreparedness on inaccurate forecasts by the National Center for Hydrometerological Forecasting. The Center demurred, saying that notices released by the national center as well as the local center all included Quang Ngai as a potential region. Regardless of the truth, Quang Ngai leaders were at fault for their failure to prepare for the worst-case scenario, and their subsequent failure to evacuate the villagers in a timely manner. Chief of the Quang Ngai’s Steering Board for Flood and Storm Control Truong Ngoc Nhi later said: “It is unnecessary to find who is wrong and who is right but it is more important to deal with losses and stabilize the lives of the local residents.” (Source: Vietnam News). This highlights the buck passing practice all too common in the Vietnamese government: officials deflect the blame and downplay the need for accountability when the blame falls on them. Without accountability, incompetence cannot be corrected. Without competent officials, more people will die.
The most depressing fact, however, is a lack of genuine commitment to disaster prevention. In 2004, the military junta of Myanmar actually blocked foreign aid to disasters of Cyclone Nargis. While governments of other Southeast Asian countries have never gone to such extreme, very little money has been dedicated to improving disaster detection systems. The government of the Philippines came under criticism for spending billions of pesos on questionable activities (foreign visits by officials, presidential dinners abroad, campaign contribution, etc…) and yet only two rubber boats could immediately be provided to rescue victims in Marikina, which is flooded every year by the Marikina River. The same applies to Central Vietnam, which faces floods and typhoons nine months out of the year. Even more frightening is that Phuket, a popular tourist destination in Thailand, is dependent on a buoy running on backup battery power for warnings of incoming tsunamis (Source: foxnews.com).
Will they ever learn?
On the surface, these disasters provide ample support for changes. But as mentioned, these are not easy technological changes, but difficult political changes, namely improved performance, accountability and different political agendas that might directly conflict with the authoritarian nature of these governments. Are Southeast Asian governments willing to make tough changes to save precious human lives? As of now, the answer seems to be an astounding no. While the most recent disasters are very destructive, they are relatively minor in comparison to the history of natural disasters in Southeast Asia, both in terms of human tolls and property damages. The 2004 tsunami killed almost 200,000 in Southeast Asia and cost billions of dollars. The regions affected by recent earthquakes in Indonesia, on the other hand, only account for 3% of its annual GDP. The Philippines’s agricultural structure was spared, while the rest of the affected businesses could still operate as long as the phone lines are functional. In fact, some economies might even benefit from these disasters in the long run because blossoming construction sectors generally have an accelerating effect on GDP, evident in Taiwan’s improved economy thanks to rebuilding areas hit by Typhoon Morakot. (Source: Barclay and Bloomberg). These disasters will compel Southeast Asian leaders to at least consider accelerating the process of economic integration and environmental cooperation, and to devote more resources of handling future natural disasters. However, Southeast Asia has witnessed plenty of similar disasters before and therefore it is unlikely that these governments will undertake any dramatic and fundamental changes to their internal political and economic structures.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
